Journal on Baltic Security

The article discusses Russia’s non-linear (hybrid)P warfare concept. In order to fight a new generation war, Russian has created ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forces, which are used situationally depending on need. Russia employing mentality of secrecy and ‘maskirovka’ and following own rationale, Russia not only created the concept, suggesting a specific modus operandi, but designed and established a system of command, control, and coordination for this warfare. Since the time that the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ first articulated this concept, it is being used daily and everywhere – outside Russia and inside the country. At the same time, it has taken the West too long to realise the novelty and shrewdness of this approach warfare, an approach that requires constant vigilance.

Owing to the worsening security environment and the uncertainty of the security guarantees provided by the U.S., Europe needs to revise its strategy towards Russia going forward. To provide recommendations for a new strategy, this article in the first part considers Russian understanding of deterrence, analysing the conceptual differences with the Western though and emphasizing why it matters. The second part of the article looks at the Cold War past and considers the policy of containment as the conceptual basis for a new and revised strategy towards Russia. Conclusion includes recommendation for the policy makers on elements that the new strategy should include.

Abstract: Russia’s war against Ukraine has reignited discussions on resistance and total defence, influencing policy discourses and shaping national security documents. Nordic and Baltic countries, in response, have re-centred resistance in their national defence doctrines. This article critically examines the portrayal of total defence, resistance, and the role of society in these documents, highlighting the implicit assumptions of societal and individual agency. Despite presenting national populations as constructive agents essential for resilience and resistance, the analysis reveals a more nuanced reality. From Finland, to Sweden, to Lithuania, populations are positioned, whether through planning documents or political rhetoric, as indispensable defenders of their nations, with predetermined roles and expectations. This article argues that such dynamics, particularly the responsibilisation of individual actions in wartime, obscure the illiberal foundations of sovereignty inherent in the defence strategies of numerous liberal democracies.

This article explains the importance of the underwater critical infrastructure as a domain of hybrid warfare operations and the setting for increasing strategic competition. In addition, the article highlights the growing need for NATO and European Union (EU) defense cooperation in this area, particularly to respond to the strategic ambitions of the Russian Federation and its strategic partnership with China as revisionist powers. Taking a pragmatic case study approach, the article evaluates Russia’s current maritime doctrine and characteristic cases of undersea hybrid tactics with several operational examples of Russia’s undersea sabotage capabilities. This leads to outlining the emerging NATO–EU inter-organizational defense cooperation in protecting undersea infrastructure. The article concludes with policy advice that the Baltic states, as small open-to-sea member states, should take an active interest in the capability development of the undersea infrastructure protection in both NATO and EU formats.

Improving Deterrence Concept for 21st-Century Needs: Review of Deterrence in 21st Century: Statecraft in the Information Age’

This article employs structural realism indicators to predict the likelihood of a great power war in today’s multipolar world. Focusing on key indicators such as changes in the balance of power, alliance systems, military expenditure, and the intensity of competition over strategic resources and regions, the analysis aims to establish a theoretical foundation for assessing the risk of conflict among major powers in Europe and beyond. Drawing on historical precedents and contemporary geopolitical trends, the study evaluates the dynamics of international relations through the structural realist framework. By examining the evolving power structures and strategic behaviors of major states, the article seeks to identify patterns that may indicate an increased risk of great power conflicts. The multifaceted approach integrates both historical insights and current realities, offering a comprehensive perspective on the potential triggers and dynamics of great power wars in the complex landscape of a multipolar world. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the structural factors that may influence the emergence of conflicts among major powers, providing valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and analysts grappling with global security challenges and provides a deeper analysis of the security implications for the Baltic region.

The article underscores the significance of comprehending how leaders in post-USSR nations, including Vladimir Putin, Alexander Lukashenko, and Nursultan Nazarbayev, solidified their regimes through the suppression and dismantling of civil societies within their respective countries. Additionally, the article delves into the repression mechanisms employed by Russia in the temporarily occupied territories (TOT) of Ukraine, focusing on the suppression of the pro-Ukrainian population and the opposition to Ukrainian civil resistance.

Performance in a military setting is influenced more by the quality of human resources than by the amount of weapons or technology, usually described as military morale. This article aims to analyse the psychometric properties of the Estonian version of the six-item instrument referring to respondents’ motivation and enthusiasm for accomplishing mission objectives. Confirmatory Factor Analysis, examining data from the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF), indicated that the six-item instrument functioned well at the individual level and was therefore recommended as a research and screening tool for the EDF.

The article examines the debates surrounding the status and role of Russian Émigrés. The full-scale invasion launched by Russia against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 came as a shock to many, including many segments of the Russian population, but the outflux of individuals opposing Putin has been present from the 2014. That said, the invasion transformed this trickle into an outright deluge whereby estimated 700,000 up to 1,200,000 people left Russia. The article gives the historical context, describing the policies towards diaspora communities of the countries in conflict during and after WWII. Then will engage with the dilemmas surrounding the decision either to admit Russian Émigrés or close the doors on them. Current and future policies towards Russian Émigrés are considered with recommendation to continue giving preference to individual approach in assessing each case.