Journal on Baltic Security

This article analyses Estonia’s strategic response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, emphasising the revival of the total defence concept. The authors argue that it is a shift in Estonia’s deterrence posture – from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial that has been pushing this revival. Since the 2010s, Estonia transitioned away from a total defence posture towards a comprehensive defence strategy. This deterrence shift results in bringing back total defence. However, it merges the two defence concepts. Reemerging total defence efforts can be seen in the expansion of Estonia’s conventional defence capabilities, increased military spending, and investments in long-range precision weapons. This conventional focus has brought along a strong push in matters concerning resilience, such as societal preparedness at large and public education. These latter elements are shared among notions of both comprehensive and total defence.

Russian paramilitary operations, activities, and investments are on full display in sub-Saharan Africa, principally through the Wagner Group and its post-2023 successor Africa Corps. Pursuant to Russian grand strategy, the employment of such private military companies exploits natural resources, fuels ongoing conflicts, and promotes authoritarian regimes. Simultaneously, it seeks advantages for access, basing, and overflight while destabilising nations such as Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan. The Kremlin’s decisions, post Prigozhin-led mutiny, resulted in a paradigm shift of these organisations within sub-Saharan Africa creating various opportunities for the U.S. and their allies to erode Russia’s influence and reinforce a rules–based international order. This study may be of interest to the Baltic nations and Finland as NATO’s first line of defence against Russian advancement as well as the Caucasus and Moldova as potential targets of further Russian expansionism.

This article discusses Russia’s non-linear (hybrid) warfare concept. In order to fight a new generation war, Russia has created ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forces, which are used situationally depending on need. By employing a mentality of secrecy and ‘maskirovka’ and following its own rationale, Russia not only creates the concept, suggests a specific modus operandi, but also designs and establishes a system of command, control, and coordination for this new concept in warfare. Since the time that the Gerasimov Doctrine first articulated this concept in 2013, it is being used everywhere every day – both inside and outside of Russia. At the same time, it has taken the West too long to realise the novelty and shrewdness of this approach; an approach that requires constant vigilance.

Owing to the worsening security environment and the uncertainty of the security guarantees provided by the U.S., Europe needs to revise its strategy towards Russia going forward. To provide recommendations for a new strategy, this article in the first part considers Russian understanding of deterrence, analysing the conceptual differences with the Western though and emphasizing why it matters. The second part of the article looks at the Cold War past and considers the policy of containment as the conceptual basis for a new and revised strategy towards Russia. Conclusion includes recommendation for the policy makers on elements that the new strategy should include.

Abstract: Russia’s war against Ukraine has reignited discussions on resistance and total defence, influencing policy discourses and shaping national security documents. Nordic and Baltic countries, in response, have re-centred resistance in their national defence doctrines. This article critically examines the portrayal of total defence, resistance, and the role of society in these documents, highlighting the implicit assumptions of societal and individual agency. Despite presenting national populations as constructive agents essential for resilience and resistance, the analysis reveals a more nuanced reality. From Finland, to Sweden, to Lithuania, populations are positioned, whether through planning documents or political rhetoric, as indispensable defenders of their nations, with predetermined roles and expectations. This article argues that such dynamics, particularly the responsibilisation of individual actions in wartime, obscure the illiberal foundations of sovereignty inherent in the defence strategies of numerous liberal democracies.

This article explains the importance of the underwater critical infrastructure as a domain of hybrid warfare operations and the setting for increasing strategic competition. In addition, the article highlights the growing need for NATO and European Union (EU) defense cooperation in this area, particularly to respond to the strategic ambitions of the Russian Federation and its strategic partnership with China as revisionist powers. Taking a pragmatic case study approach, the article evaluates Russia’s current maritime doctrine and characteristic cases of undersea hybrid tactics with several operational examples of Russia’s undersea sabotage capabilities. This leads to outlining the emerging NATO–EU inter-organizational defense cooperation in protecting undersea infrastructure. The article concludes with policy advice that the Baltic states, as small open-to-sea member states, should take an active interest in the capability development of the undersea infrastructure protection in both NATO and EU formats.

Improving Deterrence Concept for 21st-Century Needs: Review of Deterrence in 21st Century: Statecraft in the Information Age’

This article employs structural realism indicators to predict the likelihood of a great power war in today’s multipolar world. Focusing on key indicators such as changes in the balance of power, alliance systems, military expenditure, and the intensity of competition over strategic resources and regions, the analysis aims to establish a theoretical foundation for assessing the risk of conflict among major powers in Europe and beyond. Drawing on historical precedents and contemporary geopolitical trends, the study evaluates the dynamics of international relations through the structural realist framework. By examining the evolving power structures and strategic behaviors of major states, the article seeks to identify patterns that may indicate an increased risk of great power conflicts. The multifaceted approach integrates both historical insights and current realities, offering a comprehensive perspective on the potential triggers and dynamics of great power wars in the complex landscape of a multipolar world. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the structural factors that may influence the emergence of conflicts among major powers, providing valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and analysts grappling with global security challenges and provides a deeper analysis of the security implications for the Baltic region.