Journal on Baltic Security

Poland’s rapid expansion of offshore wind farms (OWFs) in the Baltic Sea elevates them to the status of critical infrastructure central to energy security. This article examines the legal responsibilities, institutional arrangements, and operational challenges in protecting OWFs against hybrid threats such as sabotage, espionage, and cyberattacks. It analyses national frameworks, EU directives (CER and NIS2), and the roles of the Navy, Border Guard, Maritime Offices, Government Centre for Security (RCB), and private operators. This work offers a responsibility matrix which highlights both institutional overlaps as well as gaps. The article concludes with recommendations for legal reforms, capability development, and inter-agency coordination to strengthen Poland’s offshore wind infrastructure.

Suspected sabotage to submarine communication cables (SCCs) across the world has raised questions about the resilience of these systems. Data communication networks typically use a network approach, which spreads the networks’ capacity across diverse routes to provide redundancy. This study takes a risk mitigation and resilience perspective by investigating the information needed to support proactive rerouting decision-making. This study reveals that appropriate situational awareness is dependent on specific, real-time information about hazards and threats to the cable in question. For an operator of an SCC, such a contribution is not possible without being interpreted as an integral stakeholder in defence.