Journal on Baltic Security

Russia’s persistent aggression towards its neighbours has long been predicted. However, the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine proved to be a startling development. Even if Ukraine does not belong to NATO or the EU, the Kremlin, either through miscalculation or deliberate intent, ventured into unchartered territory. Similarly, Russia may decide to test NATO’s cohesion. This shift has significantly altered the security landscape for the Baltic states. This article investigates Estonian ideas, plans, and actions aimed at mitigating the escalating risks. In the realm of collective defence, an anticipated transition from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial is underway. This transition coincides with a disillusionment with the European common defence policy. While the EU is envisioned to play a pivotal role in non-military domains, Estonia places its exclusive trust in NATO for military defence. Nonetheless, this collective defence approach is not without challenges. Most importantly, deterrence by denial may not be immediately applicable. Consequently, in terms of individual defence, it appears that alongside integrated defence, a total defence strategy is imperative.

Defence policy and related activities, such as territorial defence and comprehensive defence, are considered a matter of national priority and consensus in Estonia since its restoration of independence in 1991. The actual meaning and its content have depended on numerous linguistic and cultural factors. Educational traditions and alliance relations have played an important role as well. In some cases, changes in actual defence policy content first required an ability to change military terminology and outlook. The current study analyses the meaning of territorial defence, comprehensive defence and total defence in official documents and based on focus group interviews among officers of BDCOL and EMA.

Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This paper explores Western attitudes towards such a hypothetical grey zone crisis. Using survey experiments and crisis simulations we find considerable reluctance to use military tools in order to support a Baltic ally, and surprisingly little variation across the audiences. The underlying reluctance to get the U.S. involved in an armed conflict with Russia in the hopes that such acquiescence may help preserve global stability indicates that the conflict in Ukraine only had a fundamentally limited impact on Western strategic thought on deterring Russia.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a clear sign that Moscow is looking to extend its sphere of influence and it forced the Baltic States to take a very close look at their deterrent capabilities. The article introduces the basic concepts of deterrence and discusses the differences between the deterrent capabilities of Ukraine and the Baltic States. Furthermore, the threats that Russia presents, the factors that were responsible for Ukraine’s deterrence failure and the challenges that the Baltic States are facing are analysed. The article concludes that while the Baltic States are significantly better prepared for possible Russian aggression, their deterrent capabilities must continuously evolve to reflect the changes in the nature of modern warfare.