Radiofrequency Interference Strategies Targeting Marine Navigation Systems: Political Motives and Consequences
Volume 9, Issue 1 (2023), pp. 69–97
Pub. online: 2 June 2023
Type: Research Article
Open Access
Open Access
Received
22 February 2023
22 February 2023
Published
2 June 2023
2 June 2023
Abstract
Maritime traffic from the Baltic Sea and Black Sea to the Strait of Hormuz has experienced frequent and prolonged instances of radiofrequency interference which has been attributed to military exercises, anti-drone defence, and political motives. Whilst the technical vulnerabilities to maritime systems have been identified, academia has yet to contextualise those vulnerabilities when considering ongoing geopolitical tensions notably between Russia, Iran, and ‘the West’. The findings of this research indicate that spoofing vessels can complement five main strategies: (1) making navies appear more provocative than they are; (2) revealing security vulnerabilities; (3) hostage diplomacy; (4) evading sanctions; and (5) reconnaissance and sabotage. It concludes with a discussion of future scenarios and provides suggestions for countermeasures.
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