Journal on Baltic Security

This article explains the importance of the underwater critical infrastructure as a domain of hybrid warfare operations and the setting for increasing strategic competition. In addition, the article highlights the growing need for NATO and European Union (EU) defense cooperation in this area, particularly to respond to the strategic ambitions of the Russian Federation and its strategic partnership with China as revisionist powers. Taking a pragmatic case study approach, the article evaluates Russia’s current maritime doctrine and characteristic cases of undersea hybrid tactics with several operational examples of Russia’s undersea sabotage capabilities. This leads to outlining the emerging NATO–EU inter-organizational defense cooperation in protecting undersea infrastructure. The article concludes with policy advice that the Baltic states, as small open-to-sea member states, should take an active interest in the capability development of the undersea infrastructure protection in both NATO and EU formats.

Maritime traffic from the Baltic Sea and Black Sea to the Strait of Hormuz has experienced frequent and prolonged instances of radiofrequency interference which has been attributed to military exercises, anti-drone defence, and political motives. Whilst the technical vulnerabilities to maritime systems have been identified, academia has yet to contextualise those vulnerabilities when considering ongoing geopolitical tensions notably between Russia, Iran, and ‘the West’. The findings of this research indicate that spoofing vessels can complement five main strategies: (1) making navies appear more provocative than they are; (2) revealing security vulnerabilities; (3) hostage diplomacy; (4) evading sanctions; and (5) reconnaissance and sabotage. It concludes with a discussion of future scenarios and provides suggestions for countermeasures.

Meanwhile, energy security is threatened in new domains - maritime and cyber. In the maritime domain, military operations target construction works of the new objects as well as operating interconnectors, cables, LNG terminals, and other strategic assets. Regular situational awareness in the Baltic Sea region is lacking, as is sufficient naval and civilian maritime cooperation. In the cyber realm attacks become more frequent and more complex, critical infrastructure being the main target. As cyber security expertise and exercise are lacking and integration into European natural gas and electricity systems is not completed, blackout scenario in Baltic States remains possible.