Journal on Baltic Security

This article examines how a state that chooses to authorize a resistance organization as part of its national defence plan in order to increase its national resilience legitimizes that organization through the three phases of pre-conflict, conflict and occupation, and resumption of sovereignty. It will demonstrate the necessity of a legal framework for its authorization to obtain both domestic and international legitimacy. It will also cover the necessity of compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) during hostilities. Furthermore, it will touch on how this legal framework functions on behalf of the legitimate government in occupied territory against an adversary by not allowing adversarial political consolidation, while also assisting in the prevention of the creation of competing organizations in occupied territory with goals that deviate from those of the sovereign and legitimate government.

Small nations, facing expansionist-minded and intrusive neighbors such as Russia or China, are revising their total defense strategies and plans. Within these total defense plans, nations are pre-planning citizen-based resistance schemes that rely on non-professionalized, civilian population segments to take an active role in resisting an occupying foreign power. Ukraine, invaded by Russia in February 2022, is one such nation enacting a whole-of-society resistance scheme under a brutal, high-intensity assault. How then, does a nation-state conceptualize, craft, and execute command and control for distributed resistance operations? This article first analyzes the substance and challenges of resistance and command and control. Next, a framework is presented on how to conceptualize an appropriate command and control scheme. Finally, practical examples are given of how resistance command methods proved effective or ineffective, and why. This article is designed to assist in the conceptualization, development, and implementation of national resistance command and control schemes.

Russia’s aggressive actions in the vicinity of the borders of the Baltic states have stirred the discussion on the Comprehensive defense concept. This concept is based on whole-of-government and whole-of-society involvement in resistance against occupying power. This article examines the role of the armed forces in the resistance movement from a small state perspective. To define the role of the armed forces, this article scrutinizes the historical experience of the Latvian Forest Brothers and the traditional development phases of the resistance movement. The article argues that the armed forces must form the backbone of the armed resistance, which integrates the other security forces and the civilian population into the national level resistance movement.

The article discusses visions of future warfare articulated in recent Russian military publications. There seems to be agreement among Russian scholars that future war will be triggered by Western attempts to promote Western political and economic interests while holding back Russia’s resurgence as a global power. The future war with the West is viewed as inevitable in one form or another, whether it is subversion and local wars or large-scale conventional war. While the danger of conventional war has declined, according to several scholars, the West is understood to have a wide range of non-kinetic means at its disposal that threaten Russia. In order to withstand future dangers, Russia has to be able to meet a large number of kinetic and non-kinetic threats at home and abroad.

Based on representative primary sources as well as authoritative academic and think tank analyses, this article aims to evaluate the role that Asia’s emerging superpower came to play in the Baltic trio’s security, with particular emphasis on its harder aspects and most recent developments, which marked a certain shift in the respective bilateral relationships. Structured according to the conventional levels of international relations analysis and rough chronological order, the qualitative study tracks the more or less direct impact of China for the comprehensive security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ranging from the systemic (global) to purely bilateral domains. The results show that China has indeed become a security factor to be reckoned with there, particularly since roughly 2017–2019 and primarily due to its deepening strategic partnership with Russia. Some of its security effects, however, are even older, more nuanced, yet still significant. Since roughly 2019, however, China’s security factor has increasingly acquired challenging and even threatening characteristics as is most clearly demonstrated by its relationship dynamics with Lithuania.

The paper aims to contribute to discussion on comprehensive defence development by looking into Resistance Operating Concept and Comprehensive Defence Handbook. These two documents are designed as a guide for the countries facing a formidable adversary to help them develop resistance (including violent) infrastructure before the potential invasion. After discussing the main tenets of the concept and suggesting a wider engagement with case studies and scientific literature on this and similar topics, the paper addresses the pitfalls and considerations of preparing such resistance in peacetime, focusing on five areas: C2, legitimacy, recruitment, potential problems in long-term and communication.

NATO member states have been steadily increasing their levels of defence expenditures since 2015. In 2020, already ten member states met the NATO financial guidelines of spending at least 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) for defence, including 20% for major equipment. In addition, many other countries were planning to achieve this target by 2024. There are two factors, however, which could slow down this process. First, economic recession as a follow up to COVID-19 will have a negative influence on the state budgets. Defence spending could start decreasing in nominal terms, followed by the challenges in meeting NATO financial guidelines. Second, while President Donald Trump put the Alliance’s burden-sharing in the centre of his policy vis-à-vis European allies, the current US administration, represented by the Democratic Party, will put more emphasis on multilateral cooperation as well as soft security instruments, including development and diplomacy. In consequence, even if the White House is going to stand strongly with 2/20% rule, it might lessen the pressure on European allies, especially Germany, to significantly accelerate defence spending, seeing transatlantic relationship in a broader division of risks and responsibilities. In this article, it is suggested that due to the economic crisis of the 2020s and the shift in the policy of the US Government, NATO member states would slow down, in short and mid-term perspectives, the process of increasing defence expenditures.

The development of capabilities for national defence among land forces in the Baltic region underscores the need for mission command as a guiding principle of leadership and command. However, the practice of mission command in the contemporary military context is far from straightforward. This article presents the results of a survey conducted with Swedish Army officers, examining their perspectives on positive as well as negative influences on their ability to utilize mission in their contemporary working environment. While mission command is envisioned to become increasingly important in the future, several obstacles are identified to its utilization and development.