Abstract: This article delves into an examination of video game streaming and its impact on shaping perceptions of the Russo-Ukrainian War as an influence operation. Specifically, it investigates the case of a 16-year-old boy known as GrishaPutin who streamed a multiplayer game of Hearts of Iron IV from the ChVK Wagner Centre. Drawing upon the framework of popular geopolitics and considering the narrative, ludic, and representational dimensions of these streams, this article situates the event within the broader social context in which the influence operation unfolds. Ultimately, this paper concludes that this event represents a novel and yet to be fully established practice in the realm of influence operations. It highlights how such information operations can evolve and adapt, with non-state actors occasionally driving innovation in ways that may not have been anticipated or planned by established state entities.
Maritime traffic from the Baltic Sea and Black Sea to the Strait of Hormuz has experienced frequent and prolonged instances of radiofrequency interference which has been attributed to military exercises, anti-drone defence, and political motives. Whilst the technical vulnerabilities to maritime systems have been identified, academia has yet to contextualise those vulnerabilities when considering ongoing geopolitical tensions notably between Russia, Iran, and ‘the West’. The findings of this research indicate that spoofing vessels can complement five main strategies: (1) making navies appear more provocative than they are; (2) revealing security vulnerabilities; (3) hostage diplomacy; (4) evading sanctions; and (5) reconnaissance and sabotage. It concludes with a discussion of future scenarios and provides suggestions for countermeasures.
This article argues that both Russia and China will re-invigorate and expand their international espionage activities. Russia’s renewed vigour in engaging in aggressive espionage campaigns is due to the current setbacks that it is facing as a result of its ill-fated invasion of Ukraine. The sanction-induced prohibitions that limit access to state-of-the-art technologies will unleash renewed enthusiasm to obtain these latest technologies by covert means, be it HUMINT and/or cyberespionage. The future robustness of China’s aggressive espionage activities is projected to be fuelled by its systematic ‘de-coupling’ from those nations leading in science, engineering and technology, such as the United States, as well as the growing opposition to the use of developmental institutions such as the Confucius Institute and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as intelligence collection platforms. This article predicts that as Russia and China become ‘outsiders’, they will becoming increasingly aggressive in their espionage campaigns as pragmatic states acting in survival and developmental mindsets, and it elaborates on some of the more relevant forms of espionage employed.
This article addresses the hybrid challenges to the maritime security of the European Union. While hybrid threat issues are generally extensively reported in scientific literature, the authors point out that their integration with EU maritime safety issues represents a novel study strategy. The article contends that the maritime space is crucial for the prosperity and safety of EU Member States. The authors suggest potential applications for using the maritime environment as a site for hybrid impacts. The results of the conducted research are essential in determining the directions in which EU security and safety policy and those of the various Member States will develop. Attention to the possibility of using maritime spaces for hybrid warfare is a necessary condition for an effective response. Proper threat identification requires monitoring and cooperation of many actors.
While concepts like risk and crisis management have grown ubiquitous at all levels of government, they have also cemented their place in academia as interdisciplinary fields of study in higher education. In the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), these types of educational programmes are typically labelled under the umbrella term ‘societal security’ in English. This article provides a succinct depiction of the state of the art of societal security in higher education in this region. After a brief introduction of the concept, the article comprehensively analyses second level degree programmes (master’s equivalent) in this field. Particularly, four conceptual and thematic areas appear to constitute the core of societal security degree programmes, though in different combinations and under a variety of labels, those being risk, crisis management, safety management, and resilience. We note, however, that these concepts and their respective research objectives exhibit extensive overlaps. This paradigm reflects how the field of societal security has emerged and evolved through a combination of different disciplinary and interdisciplinary traditions that closely follow changing policy needs. It is concluded, conceptual difficulties notwithstanding, that a common, or at least a more shared, understanding of what constitutes societal security in the BSR has emerged and continues to develop, particularly in its so-called functional understanding. This situation allows for truly transnational learning, and in so doing, also enhances cross-border cooperation in educating and training the next generation of risk and crisis managers in the BSR and beyond.
The use of various practical pedagogical tools is an important part of officer training. This is also an area where there is a long tradition in the training of officer cadets and officers in staff colleges as well as in the Armed Forces more generally. This article focuses on staff rides aimed at teaching tactics and operational arts based on historical examples. This type of staff-rides aims to learn from history with a bearing on the present and the future.
The article is organized as follows: first, the article gives a short overview of the history of staff rides, followed by a discussion on different types of staff rides. Then the focus shifts to ways to planning and carrying out a staff-ride. This includes the planning phase, reconnaissance, and the different pedagogical tools that can be used and their implementation. The article concludes with a discussion of how to think when planning and carrying out a staff rides, both practically and pedagogically. The article here presented a schematic model of the pedagogical dynamics of the staff ride for different target groups based on their pre-understanding and the complexity of different field exercises.
For several years, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), M. Bydén, has acknowledged the significance of digital security threats
(Bydén, 2017). Even now, he continues to stress the importance of taking such threats seriously; ‘Sweden is attacked everyday by means that harm our society today and in the more long-term. We are not in a military conflict on and about Swedish territory, but we are in a conflict about the values we want to uphold and interests we want to be handled in a democratic way’
(Dagens Nyheter, 2022).
Since the 1990s, the Belarusian identity has undergone several notable transformations. One of the most recent transformative periods took place from 2014 to 2020, when Belarus’ state authorities revisited official discourse on national identity elements, particularly the Belarusian language following the rise of new hybrid challenges. By changing their discursive practices, state officials, civil society, and private business simultaneously undertook a series of practical processes targeting Belarusian language and statehood narratives. The mass protests of 2020, followed by unprecedented repression, not only altered the preceding processes, but also signalled the start of a new stage in Belarusian identity development, with the shifting tempo and transformation of identity narratives and practices. From the perspective of ontological security, this article has identified and assessed the contemporary identity-building processes in the domains of language and history, arguing that past and current identity-building practices allowed by the authorities have been primarily driven by ontological anxiety.
In preparation for gray zone or conventional warfare conducted by Russian or Chinese adversaries and their proxies, threatened nations can apply a Total Defense approach to safeguard their territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Two key components for any effective Total Defense concept are national special operations forces (SOF) and volunteer, citizen-soldier territorial defense forces (TDF). This article examines the role of special operations forces as significant multi-dimensional, entrepreneurial integrators in Total Defense. In particular, it demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between special operations and territorial defense forces in the complex mission of national resistance during crisis and occupation.
Due to Russia’s continuous malicious actions against the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, as well as its ongoing war against Ukraine, most European countries have recently been forced to take a critical look at their national defense strategies and military capabilities. These reviews unearthed serious capability gaps, resulting in the emergence of so-called total defense strategies based on peacetime social resilience and war time resistance. This article focuses on resistance, arguing that the current manifestations of such a strategy do not ensure maximum results for the countries because their fundamental characteristics and principles were derived from cases that are limited in spatial and temporal scope. The article suggests that lessons must be also learned from recent experiences such as the Chechen resistance against Russia, Hezbollah’s fight against Israel, the Iraqi and Taliban insurgencies, the Syrian insurgency, and other similar cases. This article offers a starting point for identifying such critical lessons by analyzing the First Russo-Chechen War through a research model built on the common principles of Mao Zedong, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, and General Vo Nguyen Giap.