Journal on Baltic Security

The Russo-Ukrainian war, that was forecasted by some experts to last merely a few days, is already into its 5th year. Mounting evidence conveys that Russia started the invasion of Ukraine by ignoring all of the concepts it had been advocating and implementing since the beginning of its military reform in 2008. The war has demonstrated several essential changes in the battlefield operations, war-waging practices, recruitment of troops, and force structures.

This article discusses Russia’s non-linear (hybrid) warfare concept. In order to fight a new generation war, Russia has created ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forces, which are used situationally depending on need. By employing a mentality of secrecy and ‘maskirovka’ and following its own rationale, Russia not only creates the concept, suggests a specific modus operandi, but also designs and establishes a system of command, control, and coordination for this new concept in warfare. Since the time that the Gerasimov Doctrine first articulated this concept in 2013, it is being used everywhere every day – both inside and outside of Russia. At the same time, it has taken the West too long to realise the novelty and shrewdness of this approach; an approach that requires constant vigilance.

When on 15th of October 2008 Russia officially announced a decision to reform its armed forces some observers were very fast to claim this as a new adventurist's move of Russian political and military leadership. Almost nobody took it seriously. Today the situation is different with more and more specialists and officials pointing at the Russian army and recognising it as an emerging threat. How did this happen that we became caught in surprise again? Why did nobody pay any attention to what was going on in the Russian Army, or if somebody did, why nobody took them seriously. Those and other questions still remain to be answered.