Journal on Baltic Security

Latvia has consistently supported Ukraine since Russia’s unprovoked invasion. Importantly, Latvia took considerable risks and provided military support to Ukraine even before Russia invaded despite the strong possibility that Russia might win quickly. These concerns subsided when it became clear that Russia’s plan to take Kyiv and achieve decisive victory against Ukraine failed. In retrospect, Latvia’s support for Ukraine was both morally right and politically prudent. This article, however, looks at the potential long-term implications of Latvia’s foreign and domestic policy responses to Russia’s war against Ukraine. The article looks at such key foreign policy aims as support for economic sanctions against Russia, holding Russia responsible for war crimes in Ukraine, and ensuring stronger NATO military presence in Latvia. On the domestic front, the article examines the potential consequences of removal of Soviet-era monuments in Latvia, limiting access to Russian media, and reducing the role of the Russian language in public communication. The article concludes that although these foreign and domestic policy measures are entirely appropriate, they may still backfire in the long run if Russia is not defeated in Ukraine and if domestic responses to the war further alienate Latvia’s Russian-speakers.

The article discusses the idea of comprehensive national defence from a wide historical and geographical perspective. Countries facing different security challenges have used the concept of involving the entire society in state defence. From a historical perspective, ‘total defence’, with an emphasis on military components, was used primarily by non-aligned states during the Cold War; the breakdown of the Soviet Union reduced the importance of ‘total defence’; however, the emergence of hybrid threats in the 21st century has contributed to the rebirth of the concept in the form of ‘comprehensive national defence’, for application in circumstances wherein potential adversaries use military and non-military means in an integrated manner.

Russia’s attempts to influence public opinion outside its borders attracted increased interest in the context

As early as 1994, scholars, analysts and policymakers began to wonder the extent to which the

While potential threats from Russia and NATO collective defence commitments are similar for Latvia and Estonia, both countries have adopted different approaches in the balancing exercise between territorial defence and military solidarity. Notwithstanding their differences, both are by their nature fully non-aggressive – without room for pre-emptive initiatives, extra territoriality or asymmetrical tools. Given that in a case of a hypothetical large-scale conventional attack both countries would almost entirely have to rest on the allies, external military solidarity is essential. Until the Ukraine crisis, both offered more military solidarity towards their NATO allies than the latter offered to them. As the result of the Ukrainian crisis, allies became more military-solidary with the Baltic nations, especially having established the Enhanced Forward Presence, while Estonian and especially Latvian contributions to international missions and operations dropped. Therefore, it is suggested that both countries increase their efforts to the allied international endeavours.

In this paper we analyse emerging discourses of fear