Poland’s rapid expansion of offshore wind farms (OWFs) in the Baltic Sea elevates them to the status of critical infrastructure central to energy security. This article examines the legal responsibilities, institutional arrangements, and operational challenges in protecting OWFs against hybrid threats such as sabotage, espionage, and cyberattacks. It analyses national frameworks, EU directives (CER and NIS2), and the roles of the Navy, Border Guard, Maritime Offices, Government Centre for Security (RCB), and private operators. This work offers a responsibility matrix which highlights both institutional overlaps as well as gaps. The article concludes with recommendations for legal reforms, capability development, and inter-agency coordination to strengthen Poland’s offshore wind infrastructure.
The article discusses the evolution of political and security cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the United States of America in the years 1999–2019. It argues that this relationship has been strengthened over the past several years to an unprecedented level, as reflected by the following: (a) permanent presence of US troops and facilities
on the territory of the Republic of Poland; (b) significant reinforcement of energy cooperation that would contribute to the security of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region; (c) development of a high-level strategic dialogue; and (d) successful widening of the mutual scope of soft security collaboration, including economic, digital and people-topeople
aspects. In this article, I try to answer the following questions: what are the reasons of upgrading Poland–US political and security relations? What was the process shaping US– Poland relationship during 1999–2019? What are the priorities for both sides in this cooperation? I suggest that the past 20 years of Polish–American relationship can be divided into three stages: (a) between Poland’s accession to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian aggression towards Ukraine (1999–2014); (b) between the NATO Summit in Newport and the swearing in of Donald Trump as President of the United States (2014–2017); and (c) then onwards (2017/2018–).
the Republic of Poland is one of the main authorities in wartime. But, in Polish legal acts it is not completely clear when the Commander-in-Chief should be appointed. According to Polish law, the Commander-in-Chief shall be appointed in certain situations - for the duration of the war and (sometimes) in the martial law period. In this paper the author will describe these situations and analyse the provisions of his functioning in peace time and in war.
Also, it should be noted, that today in Poland decision-makers adopted some very important changes in the Act of 21 November 1967 - Universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland. These changes are to be basis for new rules for the functioning of the Commander-in-Chief and it is a result of the reform of the command and control system. But, the problem is that some parts of legislation were challenged in the Constitutional Court and the case is pending… Every single act of the packet might be not in accordance with the Act of Constitution.