emerging media outlets, e.g. social networking sites and blogs makes them easy-to-use weapons, giving power and courage to individuals to form groups that are able to win or at least force concessions from stronger forces. Today, terrorist groups know
that opinions can be influenced using networked media and this knowledge empowers and enables them to alienate their audience and sometimes provoke them into violent actions. To understand the strategic information manoeuvres used by such groups, e.g.,
trans-national terrorist groups, we study the channels (blogs, Twitter, etc.) and methods (e.g., influential actors/groups) they use to disseminate messages pertaining to recruitment, radicalization, and raising funds. We collect data from several sources, including
over 130 blog websites known for pro-Russian propaganda for events such as the Crimean water crisis and Trident Juncture Exercise (TRJE 15). In addition to blogs, we collect data from Twitter for the above-mentioned events to study the crossinfluence
of various social media platforms in conducting strategic information manoeuvres. The study shows that groups are able to spread their opinions and create emotional attitudes for their followers through the sophisticated and blended use of these network media platforms via powerful actors, trolls, and botnets.
We design social and network science informed methodologies to study the sociotechnical behaviours of trolls and botnets and develop detection tools ready to be deployed for Cyber operations. The tools have been further tested in the information operations of ISIL, e.g., beheading of hostages in orange jump suits. This study helps identifying the actions needed to win this “battle of ideas”.
The aim of the current article is to provide analysis
of information operations of the Russian Federation performed against the Ukrainian state and defence forces from 1 April until 31 December 2014. Russia uses ideological, historical, political symbols and narratives for justifying and supporting their military,
economic and political campaigns not only in Donbass but in the whole of Ukraine. The article concentrates on the various means of meaning-making carried out by Russian information operations regarding the Ukrainian state and military structures.
Social systems are complex structures that consist
of different sub-systems. Therefore, understanding social systems is more difficult than comprehending electronic or mechanical systems. What makes social systems more complex than other systems is that society is not simply the sum of each individual in the society. In the current global system, the countries, which have become small villages, try to meet national security needs by converting the unknown to known and identifying the correlation among political, military, social and economic events. The current crisis management concepts are conducted through systematic approaches. Besides, the management of social, economic and political crises need to be conducted in a holistic approach covering all sub-systems. At this point, the function of Social Network Analysis (SNA) emerges. SNA, which forms the main subject of this paper, is a tool for examining the structure of a crisis through correlating the sub-elements. The aim of this study is to show how SNA can be used in crisis management. First, SNA is performed on a generic crisis situation and the results are presented. Then, the additional critical data requirements are put forward to manage the crisis effectively.
the Republic of Poland is one of the main authorities in wartime. But, in Polish legal acts it is not completely clear when the Commander-in-Chief should be appointed. According to Polish law, the Commander-in-Chief shall be appointed in certain situations - for the duration of the war and (sometimes) in the martial law period. In this paper the author will describe these situations and analyse the provisions of his functioning in peace time and in war.
Also, it should be noted, that today in Poland decision-makers adopted some very important changes in the Act of 21 November 1967 - Universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland. These changes are to be basis for new rules for the functioning of the Commander-in-Chief and it is a result of the reform of the command and control system. But, the problem is that some parts of legislation were challenged in the Constitutional Court and the case is pending… Every single act of the packet might be not in accordance with the Act of Constitution.
and its European Partners are the norm in the post-Cold War Era. Commonplace today are Multinational Brigades, composed of staffs and subordinate units representing almost every NATO Country and Partner, participating in training exercises or actual operations in both the European and Southwest Asian Theatres.
Leadership challenges are prevalent for the Multinational Brigade Commander and his staff, especially those challenges they face in achieving an effective level of brigade interoperability in order to
conduct successful operations in NATO’s present and future operating environments. The purpose of this paper is twofold: to examine the major interoperability obstacles a multinational brigade commander and his staff are likely to encounter during the planning and execution of brigade operations; and, to recommend actions and measures a multinational brigade commander and his staff can implement to facilitate interoperability in a multinational brigade operating environment. Several key interoperability topics considered integral to effective multinational brigade operations will be examined and analysed to include understanding partner unit capabilities and limitations facilitated by an integration plan, appropriate command and support relationships, compatible communications, synchronized intelligence and information collection, establishing effective liaison, and fratricide prevention.
The paper conclusion will urge for a NATO land brigade doctrine considering doctrine’s critical importance to effective brigade command and control interoperability and the expected missions a land brigade will encounter in future NATO operating
environments as part of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).
with “lessons learned.” It offers a few tentative observations on the limitations and dangers of lessons. To illustrate these (but not necessarily prove them), it then looks at the experiences of the Israel Defence Forces, particularly its armoured forces, from 1948
to 1973. Finally, three recommendations discuss how military organizations might reduce the danger of lessons leading them astray.
Although a military organization is a special form of
institution, grouping people and resources for the special purposes of defence and fighting in general, it is influenced by the same rules and conditions that other organizations are. Considering the problems of land forces organizational structures in tactical operations it is important to refer to the theory of organization and management which may constitute a point of reference to properly devise and forming up of land forces structures assuming that such forces make up an organization – since this is a team of soldiers including their resources, shaped into an adequate structure and predestined to perform a definite task. The article is an attempt to reveal multiple mutual relations of tactical, technical and economical inventions inflicting structural transformation of the army in the context of the reality of a middle-sized country today.
The warfare is evolving and it is confirmed by last
conflicts in which Russia was involved. They were asymmetric in nature and their objectives, developments, consequences in broader sense and end states have been a matter of research by many scholars. The nature of those conflicts is causing concerns and a question if there were randomly run or just perfectly synchronized operations? If so, should a hybrid war be considered a way of strategy and its objectives seen through the prism of the Russia’s interests? The answer to this question can be obtained after the evaluation of the theory and practice employed by the Russian Federation in the concept of hybrid war. This is the purpose of this article. The results of the research are presented by solving the following problem: What does the concept of the new generation warfare mean?
challenges which might face a commander leading multinational and multicultural troops, especially in peacekeeping and peace support operations. Peacekeeping missions have had an international character since their beginning. Internationalization of operations provides legitimacy to a mission and greater international support. However the combined operation causes significant challenges, especially for commanders, who have to lead these types of military units. The paper presents the benefits as well as challenges which faces the international leader in multiethnic environment. The author, based on his own experience gained in international deployments, presents his views and suggestions regarding the aspects of commanding multinational and multicultural troops.