Extended Deterrence Dilemmas in the Grey Zone: Trans-Atlantic Insights on Baltic Security Challenges
Volume 5, Issue 2 (2019), pp. 5–16
Pub. online: 15 December 2019
Type: Research Article
Open Access
Open Access
Received
12 April 2019
12 April 2019
Accepted
14 November 2019
14 November 2019
Published
15 December 2019
15 December 2019
Abstract
Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This paper explores Western attitudes towards such a hypothetical grey zone crisis. Using survey experiments and crisis simulations we find considerable reluctance to use military tools in order to support a Baltic ally, and surprisingly little variation across the audiences. The underlying reluctance to get the U.S. involved in an armed conflict with Russia in the hopes that such acquiescence may help preserve global stability indicates that the conflict in Ukraine only had a fundamentally limited impact on Western strategic thought on deterring Russia.
References
Notes
[1] 1 The paper focuses on Latvia and Lithuania, as these two Baltic
countries seemed to experience the most serious gaps in defense preparedness prior to 2014.
In addition, historically, the Western publics seem somewhat more familiar with the developments in
Estonia and it is frequently chosen as a single regional case study; as the discourse concerning
the other two Baltic states was rapidly gaining in intensity, it was interesting to see whether
greater familiarity would be developed.
[3] In addition to the issuing of verbal ultimatums,
the concept of threat tends to include economic, diplomatic, and other means of pressure,
and some even treat limited military action as a threat
(Gochman and Maoz 1984;
Danilovic, 2001).
[4] Considerable controversy exists over whether certain threats
are deterrence or compellence, reflecting some of the ambiguity in the basic
conceptual distinction between the two. Here, we consider a more timely (immediate)
threat following from general deterrence failure to be
immediate deterrence, since the quid pro quo is status quo ante.
[5] A small state protégé, whose very survival might be at risk,
may be myopically inclined to equate a counter-threat with abandonment.
However, the global power defender tends to operate under a longer time horizon,
including the prospect of repeated interactions with the
challenger, and must therefore use a more nuanced reaction scale.
Bragg, B. (2016),
“Specifying & systematizing how we think about the gray zone,”
NSI, prepared for Strategic Multilayer Assessment, Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Retrieved from
http://nsiteam.com/sma-publications/.
Bumiller, E.,
“Threats and Responses: the Allies; Bush Appeals To New Allies On Iraq Plans,”
New York Times, Nov 24, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/24/world/threats-and-responses-the-allies-bush-appeals-to-new-allies-on-iraq-plans.html.
Eurobarometer 72, Vol. 1, Autumn 2009,
“Public opinion in the European Union,”
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_vol1_en.pdf
Delfi.lt, Nov 23, 2012, Jackevicius, M. and
Samoskaite, E.,
“Apklausa: realiu gresmiu Lietuvai nera, o jei bus – mus apgins NATO?,” [“Survey:
no real threats to Lithuania, and NATO will defend us?,” in Lithuanian],
http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/apklausa-realiugresmiu-lietuvai-nera-o-jei-bus-mus-apgins-nato.d?id=60063003.
Lasas, A.,
“Lietuvos gyventojams baisesnes socialines gresmes, o ne Rusijos invazija ar terorizmas,”
June 28, 2016, 15min.lt,
https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/lietuvos-gyventojams-baisesnes-socialines-gresmes-o-ne-rusijos-invazija-arterorizmas-56-647741
Maliukevicius, N.
“Informacijos karas: Rusijos poziuris,”
Karas Nr. 7, 2005,
http://www.postscriptum.lt/7-karas/informacijos-karas-rusijospoziuris
Maliukevicius, N.
“Russia’s Information Policy in Lithuania: The Spread of Soft Power or Information Geopolitics?”
Baltic Security and Defense Review,
Vol. 9, 2007,
http://appc.lv/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Nerijus-Maliukevicius.pdf
Milne, R., Jones, S., and Hille, K.,
“Russian air incursions rattle Baltic states,”
Financial Times, Sep 24, 2014,
https://www.ft.com/content/9d016276-43c3-11e4-baa7-00144feabdc0.
Porter, T., Nov 11, 2018,
“Trump Confused the Baltics With Balkans—And Accused Confused Leaders of Starting Yugoslav Wars: Report,”
Newsweek,
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-confused-baltics-balkans-and-accused-confused-leaders-starting-yugoslav-1210939?fbclid=IwAR2rBAlposNzOx7V6e1i7W5yLjgKbw2pZI_517hYa6rN1oBDxF__ZlHisMY.
Shlapak, D.A. and Michael W. Johnson, M.W.,
“Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics,”
Rand, 2016,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.
Simmons, K., Stokes, B., and Poushter, J.
“NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid,”
Pew Research Center, June 2015,
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/06/Pew-Research-Center-Russia-Ukraine-Report-FINAL-June-10-2015.pdf
Slekys, D.,
Maslaus vycio beieskant: Lietuviskos karines minties raida ir bukle po nepriklausomybes atkurimo (1990-2014)
[In search for pensive vytis: the development of Lithuanian military thought since the restoration of independence (1990-2014), in Lithuanian]
(Vilnius: Gen. J. Zemaicio Lietuvos Karo Akademija,
2015).
World Bank,
“Lithuania: Military expenditure (% of GDP),”
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?contextual=default&end=2015&locations=LT&start=1995&view=chart.
