The article discusses Russia’s non-linear (hybrid)P warfare concept. In order to fight a new generation war, Russian has created ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forces, which are used situationally depending on need. Russia employing mentality of secrecy and ‘maskirovka’ and following own rationale, Russia not only created the concept, suggesting a specific modus operandi, but designed and established a system of command, control, and coordination for this warfare. Since the time that the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ first articulated this concept, it is being used daily and everywhere – outside Russia and inside the country. At the same time, it has taken the West too long to realise the novelty and shrewdness of this approach warfare, an approach that requires constant vigilance.
The article examines the debates surrounding the status and role of Russian Émigrés.
The full-scale invasion launched by Russia against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 came as a shock to many, including many segments of the Russian population,
but the outflux of individuals opposing Putin has been present from the 2014. That said, the invasion transformed this trickle into an outright
deluge whereby estimated 700,000 up to 1,200,000 people left Russia. The article gives the historical context, describing the policies towards
diaspora communities of the countries in conflict during and after WWII. Then will engage with the dilemmas surrounding the decision either to
admit Russian Émigrés or close the doors on them. Current and future policies towards Russian Émigrés are considered with recommendation to
continue giving preference to individual approach in assessing each case.
The article discusses visions of future warfare articulated in recent Russian military publications. There seems to be agreement among Russian scholars that future war will be triggered by Western attempts to promote Western political and economic interests while holding back Russia’s resurgence as a global power. The future war with the West is viewed as inevitable in one form or another, whether it is subversion and local wars or large-scale conventional war. While the danger of conventional war has declined, according to several scholars, the West is understood to have a wide range of non-kinetic means at its disposal that threaten Russia. In order to withstand future dangers, Russia has to be able to meet a large number of kinetic and non-kinetic threats at home and abroad.
Russia once again pushes its way to emerge as a major power in the international order after losing this status in the modern ‘time of troubles’
in the 1990s. Its political and military strategic leaders demonstrated willingness to
employ all instruments of power as means of escalation to achieve this goal. Meanwhile, tactical military commanders
are the ones in direct control of military escalation means and therefore their motivations, agility and rationality are
also important factor in the Russian escalation processes towards the West. This research will look at these processes
through lenses of game and decision-making theories.
The current study discusses differences between Russia and the Baltic States in terms of their strategic narratives, as well as how they interpret key terms and concepts in the field of security. To frame the scope of the study, the strategic narrative of Russia for the Baltic countries and the Baltic strategic narrative(s) for Russia are compared and analysed. Both sides are also locked within the bigger framework of European Union’s economic sanctions against Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance’s deterrence concept. On the other hand, the Baltic States and Russia have a lot to gain from possible improvements in economic relations and reduction of regional security tensions.