Journal on Baltic Security

This article analyses Estonia’s strategic response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, emphasising the revival of the total defence concept. The authors argue that it is a shift in Estonia’s deterrence posture – from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial that has been pushing this revival. Since the 2010s, Estonia transitioned away from a total defence posture towards a comprehensive defence strategy. This deterrence shift results in bringing back total defence. However, it merges the two defence concepts. Reemerging total defence efforts can be seen in the expansion of Estonia’s conventional defence capabilities, increased military spending, and investments in long-range precision weapons. This conventional focus has brought along a strong push in matters concerning resilience, such as societal preparedness at large and public education. These latter elements are shared among notions of both comprehensive and total defence.

The paper aims to contribute to discussion on comprehensive defence development by looking into Resistance Operating Concept and Comprehensive Defence Handbook. These two documents are designed as a guide for the countries facing a formidable adversary to help them develop resistance (including violent) infrastructure before the potential invasion. After discussing the main tenets of the concept and suggesting a wider engagement with case studies and scientific literature on this and similar topics, the paper addresses the pitfalls and considerations of preparing such resistance in peacetime, focusing on five areas: C2, legitimacy, recruitment, potential problems in long-term and communication.

This article explores how comprehensive defence has been introduced in Latvia, and focuses on society’s involvement and tasks in the state defence. This approach envisages a significant change in society’s relationship with the armed forces and state defence. Differently from many other countries, Latvia maintains its system without introducing conscription and instead puts efforts towards youth education in defence. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence involves different society groups and NGOs in defining their role in state defence. This article also discusses the concepts of resistance and non-collaboration as part of comprehensive defence.

This study aimed to offer an in-depth insight into intellectual dilemmas associated with a comprehensive approach to national defence using Estonia as an example to demonstrate that comprehensive approach in itself may not be enough to feel safe and secure. The authors focused on two specific theoretical questions. First, how security threats are determined in Estonia, including the impact of such a phenomenon as macro-securitization? Second, how various levels of comprehensive approach relate to each other in the way that a shared security culture will be created?