Journal on Baltic Security

The role of artificial intelligence for future warfare is a hotly debated topic among military scholars. Many authors see the recent emergence of advanced AI systems as heralding a new ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA), leading humans to work in deeper cooperation with autonomous machines and enabling a greater role for algorithms in operational planning or even in command decisions (see Raska, 2021). Others provide more nuanced views, in which the importance of AI is accepted, but in which the current applications of ‘narrow AI’ (systems such as machine learning algorithms) are seen as all too unreliable and ‘brittle’ to be allowed roles beyond monitoring data streams and operating semi-autonomous drones under human supervision (Hunter and Bowen, 2023; Johnson, 2024).

This being said, all major and minor powers are currently engaged in a strategic competition to develop and employ AI for military purposes. Professional Military Education (PME) seeks to address this challenge by, inter alia, preparing officers to compete – and ultimately prevail – on future, AI-enabled battlefields. Since AI technologies rely on algorithms, data, and computational power, it may appear that there exists an optimal, scientifically determined path to victory in this domain. However, different militaries conceptualise and approach AI in distinct ways. Accordingly, future military leaders must recognise that adversaries may employ AI in culturally conditioned – and potentially unexpected – ways to achieve battlefield or even strategic advantages. In this article we focus on the domestic discussions in China and Russia on the role of AI in military affairs, using the ‘paradigm of warfare’ as our analytical lens. By paradigm of warfare, we refer to a conception shared within or among a group of states on the prevailing characteristics of warfare: its operational approaches, prevailing technologies and organisational forms among other things.

There is an abundance of research on Chinese and Russian conceptions on the role of artificial intelligence for military affairs (see Nocetti, 2020; Kania, 2021; Zysk, 2021; Nadibaidze, 2022; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2023; Marcinek and Han, 2023; Nadibaidze and Miotto, 2023; Bendett, 2024; Solovyeva, 2024; Zysk, 2024). However, whereas Chinese and Russian domestic debates have been analysed, there is a lack of studies comparing the core ideas of their military AI visions, particularly utilising primary language sources. China and Russia offer interesting cases for research as their military thinking shares historical roots in Marxism, and as their security cooperation is increasing at a fast pace (Kirchberger, Sinjen, and Wörmer, 2022; Kukkola and Puranen, 2022). In 2022, China and Russia declared a ‘no-limits partnership’, signalling their hostility towards NATO, and hinting at the possibility of even deeper security and military cooperation (Reuters, 2022). With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, cooperation has entered even deeper levels, and Russia’s Vladimir Putin has called for intensified collaboration also in artificial intelligence (Faulconbridge, 2023).

Both China and Russia consider artificial intelligence as a strategic technology. President Vladimir Putin declared famously in September 2017 that whoever leads in the development of AI, rules the world (Kremlin, 2017) Interestingly, Julian Nocetti has argued that Putin made his statement in response to China’s AI declaration (Nocetti, 2020). Later, Russia adopted a national AI strategy in 2019 and updated it in 2024. Consequently, AI development has been integrated into a host of other strategies and national programmes which are supposed to build Russia’s digital economy and society by 2030 (Zysk, 2024; Bendett, 2024). Although artificial intelligence was initially framed as a scientific and socio-economic matter in Russia, it turned quickly into a military issue, as Putin himself argued in 2020 that AI development was a military priority to counter American and NATO advantages (Kretsup and Ramm, 2020). AI development was declared as one of the priorities of the State’s Arms Programme (GPV 2027–2033) in 2021, and Putin has repeatedly demanded the increased use of AI in military applications (Litovkin, 2021; Kremlin, 2024). Consequently, in 2022 the Russian Ministry of Defence adopted a concept for AI use in the Armed Forces (Shakirov, 2023).

China has also elevated AI to national strategic prominence by publishing its first AI strategy, in August 2017. The ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ describes AI as a disruptive technology, which will unleash revolutionary advances in economy, science, and national defence, and which has become a central focus of great power competition. The Plan is to proceed in three steps: in 2020 China’s AI applications were set to reach the level of the world's most advanced states, and AI is already advancing China’s economic development in numerous fields. By 2025 major breakthroughs have been achieved, and China shows considerable lead at least in some AI applications. Finally, in 2030, China is to lead the world in both applications and technologies, as well as in theories of artificial intelligence, maintaining a global ‘commanding height’ in the technology (State Council Information Office, 2017; Zeng, 2022). In contrast to Russia, China has not yet published any strategic documents focusing on the military applications of artificial intelligence. The 2017 plan mentions the importance of national defence and emphasises the advancement of ‘military-civil fusion’ (军民融合) but does not detail applications. Artificial intelligence is also mentioned briefly in China’s two most recent (2015 and 2019) military strategies, which envision a change in the form of warfare from its ‘informatised’ form towards ‘intelligentisation’ – a development the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should not be overlooking (State Council Information Office, 2015; State Council Information Office, 2019).

Russia and China have placed military AI in the centre of their national strategies. Thus, an interesting question arises on whether the two countries share similar ideas and visions on future warfare as well. In the currently intensifying great power struggle, often called ‘the New Cold War’, China and Russia form one, revisionist, status-seeking, and authoritarian side of a triangle united by its opposition to the United States and its allies. In addition to clarifying the degree to which the Chinese and Russian military thinking aligns, exploring their views on the role of AI for military affairs should offer insight into how great power competition affects the understanding of the role of breakthrough technologies in great power relations.

In its source material the article taps into debates in Chinese and Russian military journals and professional publications, which, in our view, reflect prevailing understandings of warfare and its future prospects in both countries. Russian source material has been collected through EastView Russian Military and Security Periodicals service with a timeframe from January 1, 2014, to October 14, 2024. The articles found in military journals were complemented by articles from leading Russian security and foreign policy journals like Vestnik MGIMO (Вестник МГИМО). Additionally, statements by Russian political leaders, strategic planning documents and laws, as well as Russian news articles have been used to frame the scholarly debates. Chinese source material has been collected within an identical timeframe, and consists of book-length academic studies, academic articles obtained from the Chinese academic database CNKI, as well as from websites, such as Aisxiang, which collect and re-publish academic texts. In addition, shorter commentary pieces in military magazines and newspapers (especially in the official PLA newspaper, Jiefangjunbao) have been utilised. The source materials were analysed using qualitative content analysis, whereby references to AI technologies in Russian and Chinese texts are coded and grouped into broader thematic categories reflecting distinct perspectives on technology and its operational applications. Subsequently, these thematic categories were synthesised into Russian and Chinese ‘core assumptions’ which were compared to find alignments and deviations.

Overall, the article has a twofold aim: to develop the theoretical concept of the ‘paradigm of warfare’ and to apply it empirically in Chinese and Russian military debates. In addition, the article seeks to inform military educators about the culture-specific interpretations of artificial intelligence (AI) technology that shape how potential adversaries conceptualise and seek to exploit AI in warfare. Before the analysis, we outline the theoretical framework and key concepts for discussing changes in warfare in China and Russia. The article then presents the ‘core assumptions’ identified in Russian and Chinese debates and concludes by comparing the core ideas of both paradigms.

The theoretical framework of this article is based on the concept of ‘paradigm of warfare’. Whereas changes in the forms of warfare are often discussed through the concepts of ‘character’ or ‘nature’ of warfare (see Strachan, 2013); the paradigm of warfare emphasises socially constructed and shared understandings, through which warfare and its future evolution are perceived, interpreted, and legitimised. The concept suggests that while there exists a materially grounded and empirically observable form of warfare that is constantly evolving, the meanings of these observed forms are always interpreted in multiple, and sometimes competing, ways.

In addition to the core ideas of social constructivism (see Wendt, 1999) , the paradigm of warfare draws from the concept of ‘scientific paradigm’ (i.e. shared understandings and models of explanation for e.g. physical phenomena), originally developed by philosopher Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 2012). Mirroring its scientific parallel, the paradigm of warfare is a conception shared within a state or by a group of states of the prevailing characteristics of warfare. While rooted on material conditions, the paradigm represents historically and geographically grounded interpretations of these realities. According to Jyri Raitasalo and Joonas Sipilä, the paradigm of warfare consists of such interlinked ideas as the nature of military threats, the nature of military power, and the legitimate uses of military force (2004). An important element of the paradigm of warfare, especially for the scope of this article, concerns the kinds of military technologies and capabilities which are seen as effective for prevailing in war (Raitasalo and Sipila, 2004; also see Tähtinen, 2024).

Figure 1: Paradigm of warfare. (Source: Authors)

The paradigm of warfare evolves in close interaction with the prevailing material and technological conditions but is also connected to political, social, and cultural contexts, and thus, in many ways, reflects broader ongoing political debates. Like Kuhnian scientific paradigms, the paradigm of warfare is therefore not a unanimously accepted reflection of material circumstances, but rather a constantly evolving construct shaped by discourses and threat perceptions. And like Kuhnian understanding of the change of scientific paradigms, a paradigm of warfare can also shift in a revolutionary manner (Raitasalo and Sipila, 2004).

The paradigm of warfare guides the political and military leadership of states as they design strategies and develop their military capabilities. Politicians and leading officers in charge of such decisions cannot define the paradigm themselves, first of all, because their adversaries have a say (see below), and secondly, because the paradigm always reflects society-wide and international debates. Besides official estimates, the paradigm of warfare is impacted by discussions of military academics, scholars and analysts in universities, research institutions, and think-tanks.

During most of history, as to some extent still today, multiple different paradigms have co-existed with or without knowledge of each other’s existence. Since the beginning of the 19th century, however, at least the leading great powers of the international system have shared a rather coherent paradigm, which has included certain universally accepted ‘core assumptions’ on the role of dominant technologies and operational approaches. Today, the dominant global paradigm of warfare is shaped primarily by the views of militarily most powerful states, yet it still holds regional characteristics. As an example, the United States, China, and Russia share an understanding on the importance of ‘information supremacy’ (制信息权, информационное превосходство) and the role of information networks and precision-guided munitions, yet they differ on considerations on the importance of air defence, airborne, naval, and ground forces – practical considerations usually conditioned by geography and resources.

Besides regional nuances, the paradigm of warfare is in a constant state of evolution. Interpretations of warfare evolve as the political context changes and as technology advances. Actual wars serve as the most important modifiers of the paradigm, since they provide insight on the functionality of military technologies or operational approaches. Just like scientific experiments in Kuhnian thinking, wars serve as ‘experiments’, which provide information that either supports the prevailing paradigm or, conversely, anomalies, which challenge its reliability (Raitasalo and Sipila, 2004; Lissner, 2021).

A paradigm of warfare can go through a rapid ‘paradigm shift’ following a significant, ‘anomalous’ war. Such paradigm changing wars include the Napoleonic wars, both the First and the Second World Wars, as well as the 1991 Persian Gulf war, which have all been interpreted as demonstrating transformative changes in military technologies and operational art. However, paradigms often evolve more gradually within ‘fogs of peace’, shaped by expectations about one’s own and opponents’ military technologies and capabilities – both current and future (see Howard and Wilson, 1974). As large-scale wars have greatly decreased after the Second World War, less radical or partial changes in the paradigm of warfare have been instigated by limited wars, such as the war in Vietnam, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, or the Azerbaijan–Armenia war of 2020. Limited wars usually disturb the reigning paradigm by showcasing new or unconventional ways, means, or results, and great powers study them closely even if they do not participate in them. Today, a relatively coherent paradigm of warfare shared by most modern militaries has evolved reflecting strategic interaction between the United States, China and Russia. The three great powers have developed military capabilities, operational approaches, and organisational structures by observing each other, especially in smaller-scale wars such as the Kosovo War of 1999, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, and most recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which may yet develop into a paradigm-shifting war for all major powers.

The paradigm consists of ‘core assumptions’ – ineliminable and essential shared conceptions of warfare on which the paradigm rests. From a methodological perspective, the article seeks to identify these core assumptions by probing Chinese and Russian domestic debates on the role of AI for the evolution of warfare and by analysing their similarities and differences. More specifically, we argue that the paradigm of warfare can be identified by analysing the use of concepts within Chinese and Russian military discussions. Domestic debates in both China and Russia, have concepts denoting the characteristics of war: in China the concept is the ‘form of warfare’ (战争形态), while in Russia it is the ‘character of war’. While both concepts aim to describe an objective, materially grounded condition, they are based on assumptions and shared meanings about the prevailing technological and operational trends and thus reflect local paradigms of warfare.

By analysing how contemporary Chinese and Russian military scholars discuss warfare and its future evolution in their domestic debates, it is possible to identify the core assumptions of local paradigms – and by comparing them, a possible broader paradigm of warfare shared by both. Next, we will briefly discuss how warfare is conceptualised in Russian and Chinese military thought.

Russian understanding of war remains rooted in Soviet-era military science, although these foundations have become increasingly distorted over time. War is understood in Clausewitzian terms to have an unchangeable and universal ‘nature’ (сущность) and a historical ‘character’ (характер or содержание). The first is centred around armed struggle for political ends, and its objective laws, and the latter is largely dependent on technological and socio-political developments (Serzhantov, 2013; Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2017; Denisov and Khabibulin, 2021). The character of war is about why, with what, and how wars are fought and understood to have utility in historical human affairs.

During the Soviet era military scholars related the change in the character of war to the changes in the means of production and technology according to the Marxist dogma (Sokolovskiy, 1963; Ogarkov, 1982). The so-called ‘Military-Technological Revolutions’ (Военно-техническая революция) or ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs’ (Революция в военном деле) were an effort to analyse and forecast how the character of war was changing (Bellamy, 1990). Soviet writers distinguished three modern Military-Technological Revolutions, the first being based on mechanisation, the second on nuclear weapons, and the third on information technology (Adamsky, 2010, p. 27).

After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Material-Realist model of explanation along with it, Russian scholars began to search for new ways to analyse and categorise the development of warfare. Warfare detached itself from the armed forces based, mechanised, nuclear-holocaust visions of the Cold War (Gareev, 1995). During the first decade of the 2000s Russian military scholars developed the concepts of ‘New-generation’ and ‘New type’ of warfare which emphasised the importance of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), information superiority, and non-contact warfare (Thomas, 2016; McDermott, 2022). This kind of warfare would be won by those who harnessed the future information technology better than their enemies. In this, Russians were very much influenced by the Western military thought.

As the 2010s drew to a close, various versions of the character of war appeared in the Russian military discussions, many linked to advancements in military or dual-use technology, particularly information technology. These visions included a concept of non-contact warfare combined with Western network-centric warfare (Donskov and Fomin, 2003; Vorob’ev and Kiselev, 2011), traditional views emphasising modernised conventional forces and nuclear weapons (Gerasimov, 2019; Makarchuk and Trotsenko, 2020), claims about the importance of limited and small wars (Vorob’ev and Kiselev, 2009), and ideas about a blend of non-traditional and traditional warfare (Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2015).

Almost in parallel with the emphasis on technology, the importance of non-military and indirect mainly psychological, means began to be emphasised. This led to the development of concepts of colour revolutions, controlled chaos, and netwars which are based on subversive, covert, as well as combined military and non-military use of power to achieve political ends (Minic, 2024). Consequently, before 2022, the role of armed struggle was losing its place as the defining element of war. It was argued that new information means could be used to achieve effects similar to conventional or even nuclear weapons. War might even be averted through technology-enhanced manipulation, deception, and surprise. It was argued that information superiority would decide future wars (Kukkola, 2020; Osflaten, 2024).

However, military-scientific debates do not entirely align with how the Russian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence view and prepare for future conflicts. Despite futuristic visions, the Russian military continued to plan and develop weapons for high-tech limited wars and nuclear deterrence throughout the 2010s and 2020s (Norberg, 2018; Panschin, 2023). The war against Ukraine has, at least momentarily, refocused Russian thinking on winning large conventional wars. The war has even been called a ‘watershed war,’ a war that goes against previous theoretical assumptions (Trushin, 2025).

Conceptualisations of Warfare in Chinese Military Thought

The Chinese concept of ‘form of warfare’ shares many similarities with the Russian conception. However, in contrast to the more diverse and contested terminology of the Russian debates, China’s ‘form of warfare’ represents an officially sanctioned understanding of warfare, of which the main attributes (or core assumptions) are defined by the PLA and the Communist Party leadership. The concept plays a crucial role in China’s development of military strategy; a process in which the PLA identifies both the prevailing form of warfare and the ‘primary strategic direction’ (主要战略方向), which together provide the foundations for the design of China’s ‘military strategic guidelines’. In China’s current military strategic guidelines, the form of warfare is defined as ‘informatised warfare’, while the strategic direction points towards the eastern and south-eastern maritime regions, that is, towards Taiwan and the South China Sea (Wuthnow and Fravel, 2023).

Sharing with Russia its roots in Marxist philosophy, the form of warfare is seen as evolving through material and historical forces. As the Science of Military Strategy – a textbook produced by China’s National Defence University – states paraphrasing Friedrich Engels, warfare evolves ‘as a reflection of material reality’ (Shou, 2013, p. 28; Huai, Gong, and Chen, 2018). Materialist underpinnings were recognised already by Mao Zedong, who stated that military activity, while a domain of creativity and ingenuity, is always based on ‘objective, material conditions’ (客观物质条件), such as political, economic, and natural factors (Mao, 1936). In contrast to our constructivist understanding of the paradigm of warfare as a collection of shared meanings, Chinese ‘form of warfare’ pertains to an undeniable, materially grounded, and perhaps even deterministically evolving condition, in which military forces need to adapt in order to succeed on the battlefield. The form of warfare, meanwhile, dictates the ‘main style of operations’ (主要作战形式), which guides adaptation at the operational and tactical levels (Shou, 2013, pp. 16–21; Huai, Gong, and Chen, 2018).

Chinese debates typically identify four main phases in the evolution of the form of warfare: the forms of cold weapons (冷兵器), hot weapons (热兵器), mechanisation (机械化), and informatisation (信息化), which is the currently prevailing form of warfare. Even though such phases can be identified, the form of warfare is not a static condition, which is easy to observe and analyse. Rather, it is better understood as a historical trend, which is constantly evolving towards its next permutation, and which can be geographically differentiated (Huai, Gong, and Chen, 2018).

China’s most recent two military strategies (2015 and 2019) define informatised warfare as based on advanced sensors, information networks and precision-guided munitions, which are interlinked and connected within an ‘operation system’ (作战体系) – a concept used in Chinese military debates that closely parallels terms such as ‘battle networks’ or C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems in Anglo-American discourses. Using advanced operation systems, militaries are able to establish ‘information superiority’ (制信息权), and conduct faster paced and more precise operations than their opponents. The objective of informatised military operations is not the total annihilation of the opponent and its military forces, but rather causing the collapse or paralysis of its operation system by striking its critical nodes (such as command posts or radars) and disturbing its information flows, either by kinetic, cyber, electromagnetic, or even psychological means (Zhu, 2009; Engstrom, 2018). This informatised form of warfare is slowly transforming into ‘intelligentised warfare’, in which artificial intelligence will serve a central role (Du and Chen, 2022).

Despite being in a state of constant transformation the Russian paradigm of warfare does have some consistent core assumptions related to AI technology.

The first is the intellectualisation of command and control. Although Russians do not, yet generally use the term ‘intellectualisation of warfare,’ the substance of their views is similar to that of the Chinese (Maslennikov et al., 2020). Soviet and Russian thinking has traditionally approached the informatisation of warfare through the concept of Automated System of Command and Control/Management (ASU). The ASU are not only computers but cybernetic systems that enable planning and management of processes. The most developed ASUs are expert-systems based on predefined rules and static algorithms. They do not learn (Nadibaidze, 2022). Conversely, according to the leading Russian military AI theorist V. Burenok, AI systems are defined by intuition, adaptability, and self-learning (Arsenal Otechestvo, 2018). Russian military scholars even claim that AI can make decisions in conditions of significant uncertainty – meaning war – on the basis of incomplete information, and in the context of frequently changing situations, and that AI can decisively affect the speed and precision of situational awareness, command and control, and effectiveness of fires through autonomous systems (Stepshin and Anikonov, 2021; Serzhantov, Smolovyi, and Terent’ev, 2022). On the strategic level AI can even be used to identify and forecast threats, and to ‘intellectualise’ armed forces procurement planning (Belokon’, 2022; Leonov, Pronin, and Trushchenkov, 2024). An AI-based ‘Unified Information Space’ of the Armed Forces should enable more effective command and control by the commanders with more real time, reliable information available to automated C2 systems (Kozichev, Sukhorutchenko, and Kargin, 2022).

The second core assumption is the robotisation of warfare. In the Russian parlance military robotic-technological complexes (робототехнические комплексы военного назначения) are part of armaments and military equipment (вооружение, военная, и специальная техника) (VVST). According to Russian predictions, robots will fill the future land, air, sea, and space battlespace. They will have varying degrees of autonomy but the most developed will be fully autonomous, adaptive, able to make decisions based on algorithms and pattern recognition, resistant to manipulation, and cost-effective (NVO, 2016; Kulakov, Miroshnichenko, and Telen’ga, 2020). The ability to choose a target, act on it independently, and act in groups (swarms), separates these future systems from robots of old. Robots will reduce casualties on the battlefield and replace costly platforms and human specialists. They can be used for combat missions, reconnaissance, and support functions (Gavrilov and Koliiagin, 2021; Goncharov and Riabov, 2021; Ermolin, 2021; Evmenov, 2023). Despite their usefulness, Russian military scholars have been pointing out the normative and ethical risks of using AI in combat from the early 2020s. Moreover, they do recognise that the development of autonomous combat robots will be a challenge taking 10 to 15 years and usually reject ideas about ‘terminator’ type combat androids (Galkin and Stepanov, 2021; Durnev, Guseva, and Kladukhin, 2023).

The third core assumption concerns the asymmetric nature of new (AI) technology. Some Western scholars have argued that Russia views AI as a potential asymmetric response, offering an alternative to expensive symmetric technological competition with the West. This response should be cost-effective, indirect, and based on creativity and surprise and exploiting the opponent's weaknesses while neutralising their strengths (Nocetti, 2020; Zysk, 2021; Kukkola, 2022). Although AI’s relationship to asymmetric response is not often stated by Russian authors, the idea is present in how AI technology is framed as both a decisive opportunity and a critical threat (Selivanov and Il’in, 2019; Il’nitskiy and Losev, 2019). According to Russians, AI technology directly affects correlation-of-forces calculations as a disproportionated factor (Zarudnitskiy, 2021; Iusov and Strekozov, 2024). This means that it can neutralise military power or deliver breakthrough capabilities with relatively small investments. Additionally, those scholars focused on psychological information warfare view AI as asymmetric, as it amplifies the inherent asymmetry of information effects (Pantserev, 2021; Vdovin and Kostin, 2023).

From AI technology’s asymmetric informational effects stems the fourth core assumption which is the centrality of information superiority. Debates on AI intertwine with earlier Russian discussions about the centrality of information superiority which envisage a geopolitical but also warfighting role for information superiority (Zarudnitskiy, 2021; Il’nitskiy and Losev, 2019). AI technology is seen to affect the scientific-technological basis of the economy, the cohesion and mentality of societies, and the global information space. It creates the potential for superiority and also actual superiority already in peacetime (Romashkina, 2019; Kopylov and Vasil’ev, 2021; Bashkirov, 2021). Concerning war time, achieving information superiority – encompassing technological, psychological, mental, and societal aspects – through advantages in situational awareness, decision-making, and in manipulating the opponent, in the initial period of war or before it enables air superiority and then the freedom of action for ground forces to eliminate whatever resistance is left (Prokof'ev, 2022; Tanenia and Vdovin, 2024). Success in war and peace is based on information superiority.

The fifth core assumption is the revolutionary qualitative change of military power through the development of AI technology. Russian military scholars view AI as one of the breakthrough technologies (Achasov and Pronin, 2023). It might increase the effectiveness of weapon systems by five to fifteen times (Zarudnitskiy, 2021; Ermolin, Zubov, and Fomin, 2023). AI changes how command and control, use of fires, air defence, and electronic warfare are conducted and how non-armed and armed force is used (Burenok, 2021; Stepshin and Anikonov, 2021; Galkin, Koliandra, and Stepanov, 2021; Serzhantov, Smolovyi, and Terent'ev, 2022). AI technology produces new forms, means and tools of armed battle, and expands warfare into new dimensions and domains, where armed violence might not be the primary mechanism (Buravlev and Vetoshkin, 2024). AI will even enable non-contact warfare, support operational decision-making, and shorten wars (Fedorova and Tsigichko, 2001). Deployment of AI will change armed battle into ‘a process of mutual counteractions of combat systems as complex intellectual-informational and organisational-technical functional organisms’ (Riabchuk, 2020, p. 69). Consequently, AI technology will permeate through military technology, armaments, and military equipment and will transform its characteristics. Depending on perspective, AI either enhances existing military power quantitatively or elevates it qualitatively into a new type of power.

The sixth core assumption is that the characteristics of AI technology affect transformation of strategic stability and strategic deterrence (on stability see Kolbin, 2017; on deterrence see ven Bruusgaard, 2016; Adamsky, 2024). In Russian thought, AI technology influences strategic stability by affecting strategic military technology, including nuclear weapons C2, early warning systems, missile defence, conventional long-range precision weapons, and cyber warfare. AI technology creates opportunities for taking advantage of competitors’ vulnerabilities during both peacetime and wartime but also enhances the state’s overall military capabilities (Chernenko, 2016; Il’nitskiy and Losev, 2019; Moskvin, 2020; Litovkin, 2020; Galkin and Stepanov, 2021; Protasov, Shirmanov, and Radomanov, 2023). AI technology promises to make targeting critical infrastructure and decapitating or disarming strikes a reality, therefore challenging the very basis of nuclear deterrence. Because information security is such a central part of Russian national security, AI is seen as both a tool of and a threat for deterrence (Kokoshin, 2020; Orlianskiy, 2024). AI systems can be used to protect and control the national information space through ‘control centres’, but also to influence people through it (Safarian, 2021; Gnilomëdov, 2023). Russians argue that AI technology can become a geopolitical tool and affect the international balance of power as it can be used for hybrid warfare and have serious socio-political and economic effects (Bashkirov, 2021). Therefore, AI technology naturally becomes part of the Russian understanding of deterrence and strategic stability.

The seventh core assumption builds on the previous ones and is the information-technological nature of Russian great-power sovereignty. In Russian thinking, state sovereignty extends into information space which must be protected against external threats and controlled internally. AI technology is seen as part of a collection of technologies which ensure Russian information security and independence. This independence is related to technological autonomy, self-sufficiency, and competitiveness which are critical to maintaining great-power status (Kukkola, 2020; Bezrukov et al., 2021; Slavin, 2024). Moreover, new information-technological ‘mass-weapons of destruction of mental activity’ now threaten Russian great power sovereignty (Il’nitskiy, 2022). According to Russian strategic documents AI development is essential for Russia’s technological independence, sovereignty, and information security (Ukaz Prezidenta, 2024). Despite acknowledging the risks of an AI arms race, Russian scholars view the military use of AI as essential, as falling behind threatens national security and sovereignty (Kopylov and Vasil’ev, 2021; Buravlev and Vetoshkin, 2024).

The seven core assumptions discussed above demonstrate how AI technology merges into, conflates, unites, and recreates earlier ideas in the Russian military thinking about technology, asymmetry, military power, and sovereignty. For many Russian military scholars the war in Ukraine has definitely been a showcase war demonstrating the revolutionary potential of AI affecting, for example, all types of unmanned vehicles, reconnaissance-fire and strike complexes, ground and ship-based air-defence, electronic warfare, command and control systems, and NBC protection. AI technology is definitely one of the main drivers affecting the core assumptions of the Russian paradigm of warfare.

In China, both at the level of official statements as well as within academic commentaries, ‘intelligentisation’ is seen as the upcoming form of warfare, slowly but steadily replacing the current form of informatisation. Overall, it is seen as bringing forth a revolutionary change, which will transform both the organisational and technological structures of military forces, as well as the ways they conduct operations (Wei and Zhao, 2017; Xiao, 2020; Yang, 2019; Li, 2024).

Like its predecessor, which reflected the information revolution and its related technologies (e.g. communication technologies, computerisation, the internet), military intelligentisation draws from the broader, global, and society-wide trend of intelligentisation, in which societies and economic systems are being comprehensively impacted by the emergence of artificial intelligence, big-data analytics, and industrial robotics. Official PLA and Communist Party sources describe the current form of warfare as being only in the earliest phases of intelligentisation, while official estimates of its full arrival are not mentioned (State Council Information Office, 2019; Xiao, 2020; Li, 2024, pp. 2-16).

Academic sources, however, have suggested varying timelines on the future development of intelligentisation. Hu Zhognqiang and Sun Jianfeng, for example, suggest that intelligentisation is evolving through three phases: the current ‘germinating phase’ (萌芽期), in which AI’s will handle numerous routine tasks (such as intelligence analysis), is reaching its peak by the year 2030. The next, ‘developed phase (发展期) will emerge around 2050’s with autonomous drones and small swarms taking part in wars increasingly outside the loop of their human commanders. Finally, Hu and Sun estimate the third, ‘mature phase (成熟期) to arrive in an undefined distant future, but which will manifest as artificial general intelligences (AGI) taking charge of entire military formations and deciding independently on the design and conduct of operations (Hu and Sun, 2021).

When describing the evolving intelligentised form of warfare, Chinese scholars typically mention the United States, Russia, and other powers, such as Japan, as representing the avant garde of the new form. The United States, especially, is seen in Chinese analysis as the frontrunner in intelligentised warfare, rapidly transforming its military forces to consist of drones, military robots, and autonomous systems. The first, and most easily identified, core assumption observed in the Chinese debates on intelligentisation concerns increasing use of unmanned military robots and autonomous weapon systems. Chinese scholars generally identify an intensifying historical trend, which started around the early 2000’s, towards the use of unmanned (but human controlled) and increasingly autonomous systems. The Science of Military Strategy notes how the US military forces, beginning from the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), have steadily increased the share of strikes conducted with drones, already reaching one third of all of their strikes (Xiao, 2020, pp. 174-180). Drone arsenals of great powers are increasing in proportion, with one Chinese observer estimating the share of unmanned systems in US’ forces to reach 60% by 2030, and 30% for Russia’s armed forces by 2025 (He, 2023).

Numerous incentives drive the evolution towards unmanned and autonomous weapon systems. First of all, autonomous weapons are cheap compared to manned systems, because they do not require any life support systems (e.g. pressurised cockpits, shock absorption) needed to sustain and protect human pilots. They are also cheaper because the training of their operators is simpler, and in the case of fully autonomous systems, the software can simply be copied into new systems instead of any training. As AI algorithms develop and allow more complex autonomous systems, a clear economic incentive drives all militaries towards their increased use: cheaper and faster to produce, they provide an efficient means for generating military power (Hu and Sun, 2021, pp. 16-23; Jia and Wang, 2020). In addition to economic factors, future autonomous systems are seen in the Chinese analysis to be more capable and deadlier, because they can endure hostile environments (pressure, radiation, extreme g-forces) and they are free of human psychological factors (fear, tiredness, anger). Chinese scholars perceive the evolution of unmanned systems as currently evolving towards the phase of ‘human-machine collaboration’ (人机协同), in which autonomous systems operate alongside and under the supervision of humans, akin to the already existent ‘loyal wingman’ type of drones. Coincidently, humans will gradually retreat to the background from the battlespaces, to serve as commanders of machines, which will do the actual fighting. The next phase will see the arrival of fully autonomous drones, and finally, perhaps in the ‘mature stage’ described by Hu and Sun above, the emergence of autonomous drone swarms (Hu and Sun, 2021, pp. 16-23; Yang, 2019).

The second core assumption concerns the intelligentisation of operation systems. By operation systems, Chinese military scholars mean C4ISR systems, which connect sensors and weapon systems (in different domains) in order to close ‘kill chains’ as quickly as possible. Such systems are a central element of informatised warfare. However, intelligentisation is seen as dramatically changing the character of the operation systems, as artificial intelligence will enable the analysis of massive amounts of battlefield data, provide support for decision-making, and perhaps even conduct military operations in tandem with human commanders (Wu and Li, 2021; Nie, 2023). Such ideas closely align with debates and ongoing projects in the United States, especially the US joint level mega-project to establish the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) system, which would connect the ‘sensors and shooters’ of all branches into a global battle network. The PLA is arguably constructing a CJADC2 of its own, which would similarly be able to conduct ‘multi-domain precision warfare’ between PLA branches (U.S. Department of Defense, 2024).

A crucial element of intelligentisation in both civilian and military forms, according to Chinese views, is the emergence of big data. In the military domain, increased numbers of sensors on the battlefield (in addition to OSINT and other sources) as well as the growing bandwidth of communications, generate ‘information overloads’, which are unable to be processed by any human means (Hu and Sun, 2021, pp. 15-16). Machine learning algorithms, meanwhile, are more than suitable for analysing these massive real-time data streams, and thus for aiding human commanders in decision making. More transformative, many Chinese authors see humans commanding military operations in closer cooperation with artificial intelligence, mutually forming what is called in the discussions as ‘hybrid intelligence’ (混合智能) (Wu, 2020b). With advanced ‘intelligent command support systems’ (智能辅助决策系统) a commander would need only to define broad operational objectives, and the system would, for example, provide a range of optional plans for the commander to choose and develop further according to his needs (Nie, 2023).

Third core assumption concerns military organisations, which intelligentisation is bound to transform following unmanned systems replacing humans in all domains, and as adaptive information networks and cloud computing revolutionise communications. Intelligentisation drives the evolution of warfare towards more ad hoc unit forms (not unlike visions of Mosaic Warfare prevalent in the United States) in which big and expensive platforms (such as fifth generation fighters or destroyers) are slowly being replaced by combinations of humans and smaller unmanned systems, which together will form endless varieties of self-adapting networks, fragmented force groupings, and swarms. Further in the future, humans will be increasingly in the rear, acting as designers, managers, and commanders of these machine formations, which will conduct actual operations (Xu, Yang, and Hu, 2020; Yang, Zhang, and Zhou, 2021; Li, 2024, pp. 210-218).

The increased role of autonomous weapons and AI-aided operation systems are bound to increase the speed of warfare. This is linked to the fourth core assumption on the form of intelligentised warfare: the expansion of warfare into the ‘cognitive domain’, and the ‘supremacy of intelligence’ (制智权) becoming its focal point. In Chinese military theory, all earlier forms of warfare have had their corresponding ‘supremacies’. The form of mechanised warfare centred around supremacy in firepower and manoeuvre, in addition to supremacies within the domains (air, sea, or land). Informatised warfare, as discussed, centred on information supremacy; clearer and more up-to-date situational awareness as well as the ability to degrade adversary’s understanding of the situation (Guo, 2021). In intelligentised warfare, information supremacy and situational awareness form the basis, but are no longer sufficient. One must be able to act on the information and to spin one’s OODA-loops faster than the opponent, while harassing the opponent’s cognitive processes at the same time. Because intelligentised operation systems consist of human-machine collaborative teams, supremacy in intelligence transfers to one’s own side by having better AI algorithms than the opponent, better and more abundant data than the opponent, and the ability to harass the adversary’s operation system’s human side’s cognitive processes (Guo, 2021; Wu, 2020a, pp. 331-348; Li, 2023).

While the main targets of cognitive domain operations are the opponent’s top-level decision makers, cognitive warfare is not merely an operational level phenomenon. The concept also denotes larger scale information operations, intending to influence the cognition of the whole enemy population through cultural propaganda and influence in public opinion (Li, 2023). At this level, cognitive warfare is intertwined with ‘hybrid warfare’ (混合战争), another concept gaining interest within Chinese academic debates and closely linked with the intelligentised form of warfare. Thus, the hybrid or all-domain dimension of warfare can be identified as the fifth core assumption, as intelligentised war is also waged below the threshold of direct kinetic warfare through economic, cyber, and psychological tools, which aim to crush the opponent’s cognitive resistance via indirect means (see Xu, 2023). Boundaries between war and peace are increasingly blurred in intelligentised war.

Finally, an overarching core assumption connecting all of the discussed assumptions concerns the role of artificial intelligence for the very nature of military power. As mentioned above, Chinese thinkers see AI as a transformative technology, which will revolutionise military power and the ways it is being used, and bestows great advantages for military forces able to harness it. Due to its transformative nature, numerous Chinese scholars (and possibly the PLA leadership as well) believe that if China were to obtain a first-mover advantage in intelligentisation, it could challenge the United States’ dominance even if only a small share of its military forces were intelligentised. Thus, instead of threats, the budding era of intelligentisation presents a significant opportunity for China to ‘leap’ from a trailing to a leading position in military AI, and consequently, in military power more broadly (Xiao, 2020, p. 180).

In addition to transforming the nature of military power, intelligentised warfare will bring changes in how military power can and will be used. Pang Hongliang from the Chinese National Defence University, for example, suggests that the proliferation of autonomous weapons will decrease the political and economic costs of warfare, and therefore also the threshold for the use of military force (2018). Thus, especially highly intelligentised great powers will increasingly use military power against lesser forces, but even limited wars between great powers could emerge, as the use of robotic forces will make it easier for the parties to manage escalation. Pang foresees great power wars conducted between mainly robotic forces, far away from population centres and in regions such as seas or deserts, where human casualties can be avoided (Pang, 2018, pp. 85-89). Intelligentised wars could thus overall prove less destructive, with less loss of life (Li, 2024, pp. 28-29).

As seen above, artificial intelligence informs the core assumptions of both the Chinese and the Russian paradigms of warfare. Chinese and Russian scholars connect artificial intelligence to C4ISR systems, enhanced use of fires, and autonomous systems which together are expected to trigger a revolution in military affairs and offer a decisive advantage to the so-called first mover. Both sides appear confident that AI will be central to the achievement of tactical, operational, and strategic information superiority (or in the case of China, supremacy of intelligence), and the contemporary and future American C4ISR systems (such as the CJADC2) are seen as the baseline by both. However, Russian thinkers view artificial intelligence in C2 systems as playing a supporting role, while ideas of human-machine integration are not typically endorsed. In contrast, Chinese scholars anticipate a cybernetic, if not a transhuman future of military systems, with ‘hybrid intelligence’ formed by humans and AIs as the norm.

The assumptions about superhuman capabilities of autonomous systems as well as their economic benefits are similar between China and Russia, although Russians tend to connect AI more directly to their procurement and strategic planning processes. This might relate to the historical role of ASUs in Soviet and Russian thinking, but also to the Russian views about developing military potential at the national level.

Chinese and Russian scholars both argue that AI holds significant potential in information, psychological, and cognitive operations. Such forms of warfare are closely connected to hybrid warfare and sub-threshold operations, suggesting that AI has an important role to play even in peacetime competition. However, Russians discuss AI’s role in the cognitive domain in more cultural and geopolitical terms and typically place it within already existing theories about information warfare. In contrast to Chinese debates on AI as initiating a cognitive warfare revolution, artificial intelligence is not yet seen as spurring completely new theories in Russian thinking.

Russian and Chinese arguments on the changing nature of military power shaped by AI are largely similar. Russian scholars are more varied in their visions and see the AI’s effects as either mathematical coefficients or as qualitative developments of the already existing means. For example, Russian scholars do not really discuss the implications of AI for military organisations, in contrast to Chinese, who predict extensive changes in traditional unit structures. Chinese, overall, tend to have a more comprehensive, philosophical, and transformative understanding on AI’s implications for military power. Chinese scholars view artificial intelligence as transforming the whole form of warfare, perhaps even the nature of war itself, and providing an important opportunity for China to ‘leap’ in a leading position militarily. Perhaps this is tied to China’s status as a rising great power, which could also explain why two of the Russian core assumptions concentrate on strategic stability, deterrence, and sovereignty, and why AI is seen more as a threat than an opportunity for the Russian scholars.

To summarise, Russian and Chinese paradigms closely align on many issues, but differ in terms of ambition and vision. In Russian discourses, AI’s military role intertwines with older ideas about military power and strategic threats, perhaps more than in Chinese texts , which are more futuristic and visionary in tone. Perhaps Cold War-era ideas still hold sway, with nuclear weapons and the number of tanks seen as the defining factor of military power, despite allusions to indirect and asymmetric ways and means. In a way, Russian thinking still exists within the paradigm of informatisation; its time horizon is comparatively shorter, and artificial intelligence is seen more as a novel capability than a transformative force of warfare. The Russian paradigm of warfare seems to be more traditional, moderate, and based on material military-technical solutions. However, this does not mean that information-cognitive tools and methods are not important; they are just one of the most important means. AI technology is then just a tool – important, but not the defining element of a Russian paradigm of warfare. It is a tool of disruption and disorganisation, but not necessarily a harbinger of transformation in itself.

For China, on the other hand, intelligentisation forms the basis of the paradigm of warfare and AI technology is an integral part of it. This paradigm offers a way to transform established balances of power and to gain a definite upper hand in future wars. AI will transform warfare on an organisational level, and wars will be fought in a qualitatively different way. The Chinese paradigm of warfare thus seems much more visionary, transformative, and holistic, not as burdened by the Cold War-era ideas as the Russian paradigm. It not only adds information to warfare but also makes warfare intelligentised. It demands the active manipulation of algorithms, data, and the opponents’ minds to achieve supremacy in intelligence. This kind of paradigm could drive decision-makers to seek definite advantages, domination, and initiative through informational and cognitive superiority – always striving to go two steps further than their opponents.

These differences notwithstanding, both the Russian and Chinese paradigms are defined by the perceived threat of falling behind the United States. Russian and Chinese core assumptions are tied to the United States’ assumptions, and to a lesser degree to its allies, doctrines, organisations, and visions concerning AI’s military role. They are therefore not free to interpret the core assumptions about warfare as they see fit, and if the United States changes its views on AI, it will most probably affect Russian and Chinese thinking. This, of course, works in both directions.

Based on our analysis of the Russian and Chinese discourses, we identified seven Russian and six Chinese core assumptions related to artificial intelligence. While there are clear similarities, there are also notable differences in these assumptions: Chinese and Russian historical experiences, geostrategic, and great power positions differ, which might shape their views more strongly than either their shared opponent – the US – or globally prevalent discourses on technology. It is therefore not possible to claim that there is a shared paradigm of warfare between the two Eurasian powers, or that they imagine the future of warfare in entirely similar terms.

Russian and Chinese views are nonetheless quite close. Currently, as Russia is ever more reliant on Chinese technology and China eager for practical battlefield lessons on the use of AI, some of the core assumptions might converge. Joint military exercises and military-industrial and scientific cooperation might usher in a Eurasian paradigm of warfare in which, given the power relationships, Chinese views might be predominant. Russian traditionalism and great power identity are, however, a significant hindrance to adopting Chinese ideas. Be that as it may, any possible Eurasian paradigm would be based on the most prominent common core assumption – that of information and intellectual supremacy.

The ongoing war in Ukraine could serve as an ‘anomalous’ war for the reigning paradigms, and its implications for the evolution of warfare are far from clear or unanimously accepted among military scholars. In the minds of some, the war has demonstrated that the use of human-based, conventional, kinetic, large-scale force is futile, strengthening ideas about indirect, non-military, and asymmetric approaches supported by new technologies. Some Russian and Chinese scholars argue that wars can be won even before they begin, through the use of AI-enabled cyber and cognitive operations. Therefore, future societies might view AI as a ‘soft’ game changer. By contrast, some scholars think, also building on the lessons from Ukraine, that violence, speed and mass remain relevant, and success on the battlefield can be delivered with massive application of autonomous drones. Nations holding such views will not abandon AI as a sharp tool, but employ it to produce violent, critical, concentrated, and strategic effects.

The war in Ukraine may prove transformative for prevalent paradigms of warfare, but it remains to be seen how great power expectations and their observations interact, and whether this leads to a shared paradigm among the great powers, or at least among some of them and their allies. Our analysis demonstrates that AI has a significant role in Russian and Chinese national paradigms of warfare, which could coalesce into a truly shared paradigm. However, other events, issues and technologies affect national paradigms, and artificial intelligence, so far, is mostly an emerging and imaginary element in the war in Ukraine. It will take at least some years to see if the Chinese and Russian national paradigms of warfare will coalesce into a Eurasian paradigm of warfare – or whether they take their separate ways in search of definite advantage in a future war.

Consequently, future military leaders and their educators must recognise that China and Russia may employ AI based on their national paradigms of warfare to achieve information and intellectual supremacy – and prepare accordingly.