Journal on Baltic Security

Russia’s persistent aggression towards its neighbours has long been predicted. However, the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine proved to be a startling development. Even if Ukraine does not belong to NATO or the EU, the Kremlin, either through miscalculation or deliberate intent, ventured into unchartered territory. Similarly, Russia may decide to test NATO’s cohesion. This shift has significantly altered the security landscape for the Baltic states. This article investigates Estonian ideas, plans, and actions aimed at mitigating the escalating risks. In the realm of collective defence, an anticipated transition from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial is underway. This transition coincides with a disillusionment with the European common defence policy. While the EU is envisioned to play a pivotal role in non-military domains, Estonia places its exclusive trust in NATO for military defence. Nonetheless, this collective defence approach is not without challenges. Most importantly, deterrence by denial may not be immediately applicable. Consequently, in terms of individual defence, it appears that alongside integrated defence, a total defence strategy is imperative.

Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This paper explores Western attitudes towards such a hypothetical grey zone crisis. Using survey experiments and crisis simulations we find considerable reluctance to use military tools in order to support a Baltic ally, and surprisingly little variation across the audiences. The underlying reluctance to get the U.S. involved in an armed conflict with Russia in the hopes that such acquiescence may help preserve global stability indicates that the conflict in Ukraine only had a fundamentally limited impact on Western strategic thought on deterring Russia.

This study aimed to offer an in-depth insight into intellectual dilemmas associated with a comprehensive approach to national defence using Estonia as an example to demonstrate that comprehensive approach in itself may not be enough to feel safe and secure. The authors focused on two specific theoretical questions. First, how security threats are determined in Estonia, including the impact of such a phenomenon as macro-securitization? Second, how various levels of comprehensive approach relate to each other in the way that a shared security culture will be created?

While potential threats from Russia and NATO collective defence commitments are similar for Latvia and Estonia, both countries have adopted different approaches in the balancing exercise between territorial defence and military solidarity. Notwithstanding their differences, both are by their nature fully non-aggressive – without room for pre-emptive initiatives, extra territoriality or asymmetrical tools. Given that in a case of a hypothetical large-scale conventional attack both countries would almost entirely have to rest on the allies, external military solidarity is essential. Until the Ukraine crisis, both offered more military solidarity towards their NATO allies than the latter offered to them. As the result of the Ukrainian crisis, allies became more military-solidary with the Baltic nations, especially having established the Enhanced Forward Presence, while Estonian and especially Latvian contributions to international missions and operations dropped. Therefore, it is suggested that both countries increase their efforts to the allied international endeavours.

After the establishment of the Schengen area, it was expected that its members would develop a common policy on external border management and protecting external borders. As the current refugee crisis has revealed, some countries have not met their obligations, which has led to serious difficulties in other