Journal on Baltic Security

March 2014, with the Kremlin at first denying its involvement, war became ‘hybrid’ in our minds. The follow-on conflict in Eastern Ukraine, with separatism supported by neighbouring countries and the armed establishment and military securing of pseudo-state people’s republics, including recourse to pro-Russian fighters ‘on holiday’, has reinforced the impression of a hybrid form of warfare, raising the question: what is hybrid warfare? This article argues that the specific nature of hybrid warfare is essentially a strategic matter characterised by three key tendencies and their orchestration within a hybrid ‘grand strategy’: 1. Focusing the decision of the war/conflict, as such, primarily on a broad spectrum of non-military centres of gravity in a flexible and dynamic manner. 2. Operating in the shadow of various interfaces against specific vulnerabilities of the opponent, thus challenging traditional lines of order and responsibilities, creating ambiguity and paralysing the decision-making process of the opponent. 3. Creative combination and parallel use of different civilian and military means and methods, categories and forms of warfare and fighting, thus creating ‘new’ mixed, hybrid forms.1 At the same time, there is a growing sense that hybrid forms of warfare will shape the face of war in the 21st century.2 They seem to offer unpretentious political success by smart recourse to limited, deniable and supposedly manageable use of force. The assumption that the risk of military escalation and political damage could be kept within limits may at the same time increase the likelihood of the offensive use of hybrid forms of warfare. For this reason, it is high time to improve our common and comprehensive understanding of hybrid forms of warfare as a precondition for common and comprehensive action in defence and response.

In this way, the aim of this article was not only to shake the foundations of national defence in Estonia but also to contribute to the improvement of the current model to ensure that it actually works in practice.

of its involvement in the war in Ukraine, Brexit referendum, the elections in the US and other political processes in the

West. This article focuses on the assumption that Russian activities in the information environment of NATO and the

EU member states among other things are aimed at undermining public trust in democratic governance institutions.

Russian state-owned media is one of the tools about how Kremlin disseminates and promotes its worldview within and

outside Russia’s borders; therefore, the research questions being addressed in this paper are related to the relationship

between political trust and consumption of Russian media. To study this issue, Latvia was chosen as an outstanding

case due to the relatively large presence of Russian media content in its information environment. The paper examines

the trends of Russian media consumption and political trust in Latvia to assess if this is a fruitful further research area

since linking political trust and Russia’s information activities is a new perspective on the issue. The theoretical part of

the paper outlines the concept of political trust and the factors affecting it as they are identified in previous research,

with a specific focus on the impact of media on political trust. The empirical part of the paper examines the trends in

the growth of the audience of the TV channels retranslating Russian media content and political trust in Latvia in the

period from 2007 to 2017. Considering that political trust in Latvia is increasing alongside with an increase in Russian

media consumption, this paper suggests several further research directions with a focus on political and economic

performance indicators and the impact of domestic media.

States. This paper consists of several parts. To begin with, political discourse of Obama‘s and Trump‘s administrations‘ is analysed. The second part presents an analysis of practical level of U.S. relations with Baltic States during and after Ukraine crisis, focusing on three dimensions: political/diplomatic, military and economic. In the third part of this paper, implications of the Ukrainian crisis on U.S. relations with Baltic States are assessed, comparing trends in official political discourse and practical foreign policy of Baltic States prior to and after the Ukraine crisis.