The current study focuses on the Estonian perceptions of security and on the defence situation both globally and locally. The dynamic results of the public opinion surveys on security risks conducted in Estonia over the last 10 years (2006-2016) will be presented. In addition, to understand whether some of the security risks could be over- or underestimated in Estonia, these results will be compared with the views expressed recently by the World Economic Forum, particularly the Global Risks Report 2016. Also, the arguments why some topics have played or are currently playing key role in the Estonian security perception will be presented and discussed.
The article proposes the analytical review on what
and how to think about the security of the Baltic States from 2014 till 2016 by evaluating and reflecting the main changes in their security policy and perceptions. These three years demonstrated that the perceptions about security itself have not changed much while comparing with the previous five years. The changes were mostly in the security measures. The security discourse intensified a lot also, which was significant not only for the internal civic mobilisation, but even more importantly, but even more importantly for the mobilisation of the attention of the partners and their increased commitment. I explain my argument in two steps: first, by using traditional – rationalists – questions to analyse security policy, and second, by discussing security perceptions and discourses and asking these questions: security “for whom”, security “from what”, and security “how”.
Despite many tactical and operational successes by
brave military and civilian personnel, post-9/11 operations by U.S. led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan did not achieve their intended outcomes. Although many efforts are underway by discrete organizations within coalition countries to identify and learn their own lessons from these conflicts, comparatively less attention is paid to broader lessons for successful coalitions. Given that the U.S. and its allies will most certainly form coalitions in the future for a range of different contingency scenarios, these lessons are equally deserving of close examination. This article identifies four interrelated lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that can be utilized to inform more effective coalition development and employment.
challenges which might face a commander leading multinational and multicultural troops, especially in peacekeeping and peace support operations. Peacekeeping missions have had an international character since their beginning. Internationalization of operations provides legitimacy to a mission and greater international support. However the combined operation causes significant challenges, especially for commanders, who have to lead these types of military units. The paper presents the benefits as well as challenges which faces the international leader in multiethnic environment. The author, based on his own experience gained in international deployments, presents his views and suggestions regarding the aspects of commanding multinational and multicultural troops.
The warfare is evolving and it is confirmed by last
conflicts in which Russia was involved. They were asymmetric in nature and their objectives, developments, consequences in broader sense and end states have been a matter of research by many scholars. The nature of those conflicts is causing concerns and a question if there were randomly run or just perfectly synchronized operations? If so, should a hybrid war be considered a way of strategy and its objectives seen through the prism of the Russia’s interests? The answer to this question can be obtained after the evaluation of the theory and practice employed by the Russian Federation in the concept of hybrid war. This is the purpose of this article. The results of the research are presented by solving the following problem: What does the concept of the new generation warfare mean?
Although a military organization is a special form of
institution, grouping people and resources for the special purposes of defence and fighting in general, it is influenced by the same rules and conditions that other organizations are. Considering the problems of land forces organizational structures in tactical operations it is important to refer to the theory of organization and management which may constitute a point of reference to properly devise and forming up of land forces structures assuming that such forces make up an organization – since this is a team of soldiers including their resources, shaped into an adequate structure and predestined to perform a definite task. The article is an attempt to reveal multiple mutual relations of tactical, technical and economical inventions inflicting structural transformation of the army in the context of the reality of a middle-sized country today.
with “lessons learned.” It offers a few tentative observations on the limitations and dangers of lessons. To illustrate these (but not necessarily prove them), it then looks at the experiences of the Israel Defence Forces, particularly its armoured forces, from 1948
to 1973. Finally, three recommendations discuss how military organizations might reduce the danger of lessons leading them astray.